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From Anomaly to Appraisal and Beyond
ANA-MARIA TANAŞOCA
In present days, world developments such as increased transmigration, 
globalization of economy, European integration, internationalization of law, gave rise 
to a flourishing literature of postnationalism1 that postulates the end of the nation-state, 
of national citizenship and the advent of a cosmopolitan order and of a cosmopolitan 
citizenship. The postnationalist paradigm trivializes the nation-state and the national 
citizenship, emphasizing the internationalization of the human rights as the new 
basis for cosmopolitan democracy. The nation-state is no longer considered to be the 
locus of democracy, of rights and freedoms, of solidarity, or of identity. There is a 
trend in political science that denies the close relationship between liberal democracy 
and the nation-state, composed of transnationalism and postnationalism, of liberal-
egalitarianism and the literature of border ethics. The issue of multiple citizenship 
is seen by the postnationalist literature as one indicator of the postnationalist era, 
since it represents a shift from the national-liberal conception on citizenship2. The 
postnationalists contend that multiple citizenship represents a form of postnational 
citizenship, that rests on a humanitarian ethic of personhood which decouples rights 
from formal national citizenship and from national identity. It is true that in the last 
years there has been a trend of convergence of the citizenship laws towards a wider 
acceptance of this type of membership, but at the same time, in many European 
countries, such as the Netherlands, there have been intense debates on its acceptance3. 
The last decades have witnessed some major changes of citizenship laws, among 
which the liberalization of multiple citizenship, starting with the 1993 Second Protocol 
Amending the Convention in the Reduction of Cases of Nationality and Military Obligations, 
and an increased tendency to see citizenship as a basic human right, in accordance to 
the postnationalist paradigm. The study of multiple citizenship did not receive much 
attention in the theorizing department, the studies focusing mainly on the legislation 
1 For postnationalist literature see Yasemin SOYSAL, The Limits of Citizenship, University 
of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1994; David HELD, Democracy and Global Order: From the Modern 
State to Cosmopolitan Governance, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1995; David JACOBSEN, 
Rights Across Borders: Immigration and the Decline of Citizenship, Johns Hopkins University Press, 
Baltimore, 1997; Saskia SASSEN, ”Towards Postnational and Denationalized Citizenship”, in 
E.F. ISIN, B.S. TURNER (eds.), Handbook of Citizenship Studies, Sage, London, 2002; Stephen 
CASTLES, Alastair DAVIDSON, Citizenship and Migration: Globalization and the Politics of 
Belonging, Macmillan Press, Hampshire and New York, 2000. 
2 Will KYMLICKA, ”Le mythe de la citoyenneté transnationale”, Critique Internationale, no. 23, 
April 2004, p. 98.
3 Moreover, the ban of dual citizenship was supported by the Labour Party. This is an 
interesting development as in many studies the left is seen as the main supporter of the 
liberalization of dual citizenship, while the presence of extreme right parties is seen as the 
main cause for its rejection. See Marc Morjé HOWARD, The Politics of Citizenship in Europe, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2009, pp. 59-62.
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and less on the conceptual dimension1. As Peter Spiro argues ”multiple citizenship 
stands among the most understudied incidents of globalisation”2, despite the fact 
that it has profound implications for the states and for the political communities, as 
we will show in this paper. We argue that the issue of multiple citizenship must be 
studied by linking the legal dimension with its political dimension, as it touches upon 
important aspects of the literature on citizenship and the nation, and on democratic 
theory itself. As Rogers Brubaker points out, multiple citizenship is problematic from 
two points of view: because national allegiance is ” by definition unconditional and 
absolute and that dual allegiance and dual citizenship are therefore impossible”3, and 
because it brings a ”desacralization of citizenship, relativizing obligations”4. Multiple 
citizenship is thus problematic from the standpoint of methodological nationalism, 
that sees the nation and the state as the natural political form of the modern world5. 
Therefore, we must ask ourselves, how does multiple citizenship affect the nation? 
How does it influence democracy itself? Can multiple citizenship be accommodated 
with the concept of nation that lies at the basis of the state itself and democracy? 
Is really multiple citizenship the expression of democracy and the embodiment of a 
cosmopolitan citizenship? We propose a study of multiple citizenship on conceptual 
and normative grounds against the postnationalist arguments, a study that deals with 
it not only from the legal point of view, but also from the conceptual and normative 
points of view. Our argument is that multiple citizenship undermines the nation-state 
and even democracy, because it wears out the boundaries upon which the nation-
states were built and that are necessary for the exercise of democracy, which is based 
on equal national citizenship. In this respect, citizenship fails to act as a social closure6, 
as it was designed to be, in order to create exclusive national political communities. 
Instead, multiple citizenship creates overlapping circles of national membership that 
are per se contradictory to the nature of citizenship, and that can threaten the social 
cohesion of the nation. Contrary to the postnationalist stance that dislodges citizenship 
from the nation-state and decouples citizenship from rights, we argue that a bounded 
demos, that is the nation, is a prerequisite for liberal democracy. Moreover, dual 
citizenship undermines the equality between the members of a political community, 
one of the core values of citizenship, because usually dual citizens enjoy rights in two 
1 Thomas FAIST (ed.), Dual Citizenship in Europe: From Nationhood to Social Integration, 
Ashgate, Aldershot, 2007; Thomas FAIST, Peter KIVISTO (eds.), Dual Citizenship in Global 
Perspective, Palgrave Macmillan, Hampshire and New York, 2007; Pirkko PITKÄNEN, Devorah 
KALEKIN-FISHMAN (eds.), Multiple State Membership and Citizenship in the Era of Transnational 
Migration, Sense Publishers, Rotterdam, 2007; IDEM (eds.), Multiple Citizenship As A Challenge 
to European Nation-States, Sense Publishers, Rotterdam, 2007; Gerard-René DE GROOT, ”The 
Background of the Changed Attitude of Western European States with Respect to Multiple 
Nationality”, in Atsushi KONDO, Charles WESTIN (eds.), New Concepts of Citizenship: Residential/
Regional Citizenship and Dual Nationality/Identity, CEIFO, Stockholm, 2003, pp. 99-119.
2 Peter SPIRO, ”Dual Citizenship: A Postnational View”, in Thomas FAIST, Peter KIVISTO 
(eds.), Dual Citizenship…cit., p. 189.
3 Rogers BRUBAKER, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany, Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge, 1992, p. 144.
4 Ibidem, p. 145.
5 Andreas WIMMER, Nina GLICK SCHILLER, ”Methodological Nationalism and Beyond: 
Nation-State Building, Migration and the Social Sciences”, Global Networks, vol. 2, no. 4, 2002, 
p. 301.
6 Rogers BRUBAKER, Citizenship and Nationhood...cit., p. 23.
485
Romanian Political Science Review • vol. X • no. 3 • 2010
Multiple Citizenship, Nation and Democracy
countries, but fulfil their duties towards their peers, and towards the government, in 
only one country. From a philosophical point of view, they no longer respect the social 
contract that lays at the basis of societies and governments. Thus, multiple citizenship 
represents at the conceptual level, nothing more but a debasement of citizenship and 
a de-essentialization of citizenship.
First, multiple citizenship must be studied in relationship to the nationhood. 
As Brubaker pointed out, different conceptions of nationhood are mirrored in the 
legislation on citizenship1. In this sense, the liberal nationalist approach2 illustrates best 
the salient relationship between nationalism, citizenship and liberal democracy. Liberal 
nationalism emphasizes the salience of culture which is rooted in the political structures 
of a state3. Thus, state neutrality cannot be achieved. Moreover, boundaries are needed 
in order to preserve the cultural diversity of groups. In this respect, the advent of a 
postnational era would be ”more a nightmare than a utopian vision”4. The categories 
used by the postnationalist discourse, such as humanity, are not political categories, 
while the people and the nation are key concepts of democracy and political categories5. 
Second, the issue of multiple citizenship has to be studied in relation to the literature 
on boundary ethics6 and in relation to democratic theory. Boundary ethics deals a lot 
with the question of immigration that is deeply related to citizenship matters, and not 
only. However, till now, the literature of border ethics was not taken into account in the 
study of multiple citizenship, though it should have been. The relationship between 
boundaries and democracy is the main focus of the literature of boundary ethics. 
The debate on open/closed borders touches the issue of the territorial boundaries 
of the states, as well as of the membership boundaries of the states, as defined by 
citizenship. Although the studies do not touch precisely the issue of dual citizenship, 
we argue that boundary ethics is essential to the study of multiple citizenship because 
multiple citizenship represents a contestation of the boundaries at the highest level – 
that of the boundaries of the political community – of the nation, of the demos – upon 
which the states draw their legitimacy. Multiple citizenship is per se a dissolution of 
boundaries, because boundaries presuppose exclusivity; while the boundaries’ action 
is particularizing, the multiple citizenship’s action is uniformizing.
The notions of boundary are deeply entrenched in the processes of nation and 
state-building. The principles of popular sovereignty and of self-determination are, 
1 Ibidem, p. 3.
2 Yael TAMIR, Liberal Nationalism, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1993; David 
MILLER, On Nationality, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1995; Will KYMLICKA, Multicultural 
Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1995. 
3 Yael TAMIR, Liberal Nationalism, cit., p. 148.
4 Ibidem, p. 167.
5 Chantal MOUFFE, The Paradox of Democracy, Verso, London and New York, 2000, p. 44.
6 See Joseph H. CARENS, ”Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders” in Ronald 
BEINER (ed.) Theorizing Citizenship, State University of New York Press, New York, 1995; Seyla 
BENHABIB (ed.), Democracy and Difference. Contesting the Boundaries of the Political, Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, 1996; Phillip COLE, Philosophies of Exclusion: Liberal Political Theory 
and Immigration, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 2000; John ISBISTER, ”A Liberal 
Argument for Border Controls: Reply to Carens”, International Migration Review, vol. 34, issue 2, 
2000, pp. 629-635; Will KYMLICKA, ”Territorial Boundaries: A Liberal Egalitarian Perspective”, 
in David MILLER, Sohail HASHMI (eds.), Boundaries and Justice: Diverse Ethical Perspectives, 
Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2001, pp. 249-275; Michael WALZER, Spheres of Justice, 
Blackwell, Oxford, 1983. 
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of course, part of the problem. In this respect, multiple citizenship is central to the 
paradox of democracy: the tension between liberalism and democracy1. Because 
the constitution of the demos entails relations of inclusion/exclusion, the democratic 
theory has been under the attack of postnationalists2, as much as the cultural accents 
of liberal nationalism3. Therefore, postnationalists advocate liberal universalism 
against democratic particularism. However, citizenship as equal membership is the 
ground for a minimum of homogeneity, conceived as equality4, that is necessary for 
democracy and for politics itself. Boundaries are needed in order to establish who the 
populace that holds the popular sovereignty is. And, in virtue of these boundaries 
that consecrate the particularity and concreteness of a people, the people exercises its 
right to self-determination. Thus, the definition of the nation as an exclusive particular 
community is the basis for the functioning of the state and democracy, and also the 
raison d’être of the states finally, facts that have been neglected in the study of multiple 
citizenship.
The Postnationalist Standpoint
The cornerstone of postnationalism is considered to be Yasemin Soysal’s book, 
The Limits of Citizenship, which coined the concept of postnational citizenship. From 1994 
onwards, postnationalism was further enriched by many other studies. Since the project 
we propose goes against the claims of postnationalism, we should first see what the 
main arguments of this paradigm are, and how does it consider the issue of multiple 
citizenship. According to Peter Spiro, multiple citizenship both accelerates and reflects 
the emergence of a postnational citizenship, undermining the citizen-state affiliation5. 
Postnationalist researchers consider that the national citizenship has lost its power to 
the advantage of other types of membership, mainly regional ones. Moreover, it is no 
longer the sole depository of rights as more and more, residents enjoy a considerable 
number of rights, by virtue of an international legislation on human rights. Thus, 
postnationalists have ”dislodged both the substance of citizenship, what it is, and 
the location of citizenship, where it happens, from the nation-state and national 
citizenship”6. If national citizenship still holds as an identity, it is no longer a significant 
construction in terms of rights. Rights have become separated from citizenship and 
from national identity, and the European citizenship, is presented throughout the 
literature as a successful example of postnational citizenship, and as a step towards a 
cosmopolitan citizenship. This was mainly due to the internationalization of labour 
markets, to the emergence of multi-level politics and to the internationalization of 
the discourse on human rights. Thus, the postnationalists argue that the classical 
1 Chantal MOUFFE, The Paradox…cit., pp. 36-57.
2 Arash ABIZADEH, ”Democratic Theory and Border Coercion. No Right to Unilaterally 
Control Your Own Borders”, Political Theory, vol. 36, issue 1, 2008, pp. 37-65.
3 IDEM, ”Liberal Nationalist Versus Postnational Social Integration: On the Nation’s 
Ethno-cultural Particularity and Concreteness”, Nations and Nationalism, vol. 10, issue 3, 2004, 
pp. 231-250.
4 Chantal MOUFFE, The Paradox…cit., p. 38.
5 Peter SPIRO, ”Dual Citizenship...cit.”, p. 189.
6 Randall HANSEN, ”The Poverty of Postnationalism: Citizenship, Immigration and the 
New Europe”, Theory and Society, vol. 38, no. 1, January 2009, p. 1.
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understanding of national citizenship is no longer adequate in order to understand 
present-day realities. As Randall Hansen observes, ”a great tide of postnational 
reconfiguration seems to sweep aside citizenship and the nation state as the basis of 
rights and identities”1. Still, little is said about the content of postnational membership. 
For example, Thomas Faist sees multiple citizenship as developing ”genuine links 
of citizens across various sovereign political communities”2. However, the nature of 
these links remains unknown. What is known is, that they rest on a universalistic and 
humanistic ethic of personhood which rejects all national identity as source of rights.
The theories on the nation-state are seen as heuristically obsolete in an era 
”of interlocking legal, institutional, and ideological changes”3 that affect national 
citizenship. This is mainly due to an internationalization of the human rights discourse. 
After WWII, ”the definition of individual rights as abstract, universal category as 
opposed to being attached to an absolute status of national citizenship”4 has served as 
a basis for claims-making in the post-war democracies. Supra-national organizations, 
like the EU, also occasion transformations of the national identities. Thus, Soysal 
argues that classical citizenship is ”no longer adequate to understand the dynamics 
of rights and membership” and that 
”national citizenship or formal nationality is no longer a significant construction 
in terms of how it translates to rights and privileges; and, claims-making and 
participation are not axiomatically concomitant with the national order of 
things”5. 
Hence Soysal decrees the split of rights and identity, the two composing 
elements of national citizenship, in her attempt to define her postnational citizenship6. 
Postnational citizenship rests on several post-war developments. One of them is 
the internationalization of human rights that emerged as cosmopolitan norms, 
and enforced the rights of women, homosexuals, children and immigrants7. This 
international regime of human rights blurred the distinction between nationals and 
aliens, making national citizenship lose ground in relation to 
”new forms of citizenship, which derive their legitimacy from deterritorialized 
notions of persons’ rights, and [...] no longer unequivocally anchored in national 
collectivities”8.
In Soysal’s opinion, postnational citizenship can be seen through 
1 Ibidem, p. 4.
2 Thomas FAIST, ”Dual Citizenship As Overlapping Membership”, Willy Brandt Series 
of Working Papers in International Migration and Ethnic Relations, vol. 3, no. 1, November 2001, 
p. 3.
3 Yasemin SOYSAL, ”Postnational Citizenship: Reconfiguring the Familiar Terrain”, in Kate 
NASH, Alan SCOTT (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Political Sociology, Blackwell Publishing, 
Malden, 2004, p. 334.
4 Ibidem.
5 Ibidem, pp. 334-335.
6 Ibidem, p. 335.
7 Ibidem.
8 Ibidem.
488
Romanian Political Science Review • vol. X • no. 3 • 2010
ANA-MARIA TANAŞOCA
”the membership of the long-term noncitizen immigrants in western countries, 
who hold various rights and privileges without a formal nationality status; 
in the increasing instances of dual citizenship, which breaches the traditional 
notions of political membership and loyalty in a single state; in European 
Union citizenship, which represents a multitiered form of membership; and in 
subnational citizenships in culturally or administratively autonomous regions 
of Europe”1. 
Soysal recognizes that dual citizenship and EU citizenship bring a privileged status 
to individuals, but this is not seen as problematic; instead it is seen as undermining 
the exclusion and inclusion dimension of national citizenship2. Collective identities 
that are considered at the international level as a human right, also undermine the 
national identity. In Soysal’s view the claims-making of collective groups around 
particularistic identities, is increasingly made at the transnational or supranational 
level, and around the idea of human rights3. This can be seen especially in the case of 
immigrant communities, with regard to individual rights, seen also as an expression 
of their cultural identity, and that are sometimes perceived as opposed to the national 
cultures, as we will see. Soysal gives the example of the Islamic headscarf. We chose 
for the paper a related example, that of the burqa. The demand for dual citizenship is 
put in the same category4. The author remarks that postnational citizenship dislodges 
rights from the state : 
”Postnational citizenship is not simply a set of legal rights and privileges 
or a legal status attached to a person, as implied in Marshallian definitions of 
citizenship. It signifies a set of practices through which individuals and groups 
activate their membership within and without the nation-state. Individuals 
and collectivities interact with and partake in multiple public spheres – hence, 
altering the locus of participation and setting the stage for new mobilizations”5. 
Yasemin Soysal’s theory considers the nation-state as compatible with the 
universalistic human rights which create a new category of membership that transcends 
the nation-state. The author also acknowledges the fact that postnational citizenship 
is born out of struggles and protest that can run against the national level6.
According to Yasemin Soysal, the gradual acceptance of dual citizenship is a 
desirable change in fact, because citizenship is no longer anchored in the nation-state 
and an expression of boundaries. Multiple citizenship, as a dissolution of membership 
boundaries, is thus a postnational phenomenon: ”Another indicator of the fluidity 
of the postnational membership is the increasing acquisition of dual citizenship 
in Europe”7. Even if it may seem as a factor enhancing the relevance of national 
citizenship, we also argue that it is not, since national membership and citizenship 
1 Ibidem.
2 Ibidem, p. 336.
3 Ibidem, p. 337.
4 Ibidem, p. 338.
5 Ibidem.
6 Ibidem, p. 341.
7 Yasemin SOYSAL, ”Changing Citizenship in Europe”, in David CESARINI, Mary FULBROOK 
(eds.), Citizenship, Nationality and Migration in Europe, Routledge, London, 1996, p. 22.
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have been conceived and emerged as exclusive categories. Moreover, for Soysal the 
fluidity of membership does not affect the boundaries of the nation-state, nor do the 
privileges of dual citizens affect the basis of democracy. 
Although we argue that the devaluation1 of citizenship involves sine qua non a 
devaluation of sovereignty, because of their organic relationship, postnationalist 
researchers usually claim that there is no connection between the two processes2. 
According to Seyla Benhabib, we are witnessing a ”disaggregation of citizenship 
rights, the emergence of an international human rights regime, and the spread of 
cosmopolitan norms”3. These phenomena engender a transformation or an alteration 
of national sovereignty. However, Benhabib argues that ”there are dangers as well as 
opportunities created by the weakening of state sovereignty”4. The question is how 
popular sovereignty is affected by the erosion of state sovereignty. According to her, 
the popular sovereignty is not affected, as a global citizenship is developing in relation 
to transnational organizations that work towards global governance5. Citizenship 
is reconfigured more and more as residence citizenship, based on universalistic 
conceptions of human rights6. Thus, the author argues that: 
”Popular sovereignty no longer refers to the physical presence of a people, 
gathered in a delimited territory, but rather to the interlocking in a global public 
sphere of the many processes of democratic iteration in which peoples learn 
from one another”7. 
Cosmopolitan norms and postnational membership are seen as enforcing popular 
sovereignty and democracy8. 
In the view of Stephen Castles and Alastair Davidson, globalization processes 
bring new challenges to national citizenship and an erosion of the boundaries of 
the nation-states9. Multiple citizenship and the porosity of boundaries trigger the 
separation between cultural belonging and membership. Thus, the authors claim that 
because there is increasing number of ”citizens who do not belong”, the nation-state can 
no longer be the ”central place for democracy”10. However, the postnationalists found 
also a solution to this democratic deficit: the replacement of national citizenship with 
an ”open and flexible form of belonging”11 that transcends state borders. Globalization 
is the main process that affects the reconfiguration of citizenship because: it questions 
the autonomy of the nation-states by destabilizing the national industrial society, it 
1 This term has been coined by Peter SCHUCK in his book Citizens, Strangers and in-
Betweens. Essays on Immigration and Citizenship, Westview Press, Boulder, Oxford, 1998, p. xiii.
2 Seyla BENHABIB, ”Twilight of Sovereignty or the Emergence of Cosmopolitan Norms? 
Rethinking Citizenship in Volatile Times”, in Thomas FAIST, Peter KIVISTO (eds.), Dual 
Citizenship…cit., pp. 247-271.
3 Ibidem, p. 247.
4 Ibidem, p. 249.
5 Ibidem, p. 261.
6 Ibidem, p. 262.
7 Ibidem, p. 265.
8 Ibidem.
9 Stephen CASTLES, Alastair DAVIDSON, Citizenship and Migration. Globalization and the 
Politics of Belonging, Macmillan Press, Hampshire and London, 2000, p. vii.
10 Ibidem, p. viii.
11 Ibidem.
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undermines the national culture by increasing heterogeneity, it entails the movement 
of people across borders at an unprecedented scale1. This means that ethnic minorities 
appear at a fast speed and question citizenship and integration practices. Thus, the 
authors claim that the ”substance of citizenship and of the nation-state” changes but 
still, the state remains a political unit capable of maintaining democratic citizenship2. 
Although Castle’s and Davidson’s approach can seem ”milder” than the approach 
of more fierce postnationalists, as Soysal or David Jacobson, they argue that the 
nation must be ”evacuated” from the state and that citizenship in a globalizing world 
requires also a reconfiguration of the state, that is an increase of the porosity of the 
state borders3. This claim is convergent with the liberal egalitarian argument for open 
borders. The new reconfiguration proposed by Castles and Davidson, would oust the 
model of singular citizenship and adopt multiple citizenship as a rule4. 
In a nutshell, postnationalism turns the national citizenship into a right per 
se, as part of a rights extension for aliens. As Christian Joppke rightfully observes, 
considering state membership as a human right is more than odd, as state membership 
is conceptually at a different level from other rights5. The ideal of postnationalist 
literature is that of a cosmopolitan citizenship and of a cosmopolitan democracy. The 
idea of cosmopolitan democracy that is at odds with the doctrine of self-determination 
fails however to respond to the central problem of scale: the larger the polity, the 
less meaningful is the individual’s participation in government, and less chances for 
his interests to be satisfied. In a sense, multiple citizenship represents the ideal of 
postnationalists. If a single cosmopolitan citizenship cannot be established, by the 
multiplication and accumulation of citizenships the boundaries between individuals 
and communities are blurred. Postnational citizenship constitutes a form ”of simple 
equality with regard to membership”6. As Walzer observes, postnational citizenship 
is endowed with an important dose of global socialism7.
The internationalization of rights under the umbrella human rights, can be seen 
also as an apolitical phenomenon. The rights are attached to the human being, by 
virtue of his humanity, making states and national membership futile. However, 
according to Manent we cannot conceive equal rights outside an already existing 
community of citizens that is organized in a democratic regime8, despite what the 
postnationalists pretend. 
Boundaries, Citizenship and Democracy 
We argue that one of the main reasons why multiple national identities weaken 
the state lies in the palingenesis of states and democracy: both processes are boundary-
1 Ibidem, pp. 6-9.
2 Stephen CASTLES, Alastair DAVIDSON, Citizenship and Migration...cit., p. 15.
3 Ibidem, p. 24.
4 Ibidem.
5 Christian JOPPKE, ”Citizenship between De- and Re- Ethnicization”, Russell Sage Working 
Papers, working paper 204, March 2003, p. 5.
6 Michael WALZER, Spheres of Justice, cit., p. 34.
7 Ibidem.
8 Pierre MANENT, Raţiunea naţiunilor, Rom. transl. Cristian Preda, Nemira, Bucureşti, 
2007, p. 73.
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building processes. What does multiple citizenship entail in extremis if not the 
disappearance of nations, of states and why not, of democracies? In the postnationalist 
thought such a development is seen as positive one, but as we will see, it is hard to 
reconcile with democracy. Thus the critique of some of the most radical postnationalist 
thinkers resembles more to an anarchist manifesto1 than to a democratic one. So after 
all, why are boundaries and exclusion necessary for democracy?
Citizenship is a Janus-type of membership: it was established by the French 
Revolution as an inclusive type of membership that could foster equality of its 
members, and could reject the social inequalities and privileges of the Ancien Régime. 
In this respect, citizenship was to level the social and political inequalities, at the same 
time establishing criteria for the exclusion of the aliens. The French Revolution also 
articulated the doctrine of popular sovereignty and the relationship between citizenship 
and nationhood2. Rogers Brubaker stresses the fact that citizenship was central to the 
French Revolution, which was at the same time, a bourgeois revolution, a democratic 
revolution, a national revolution and a bureaucratic revolution that continued the 
strives for centralization of the Ancien Régime3. Citizenship was conceived as an 
equal and general status that comprised common civil and political rights, as well 
as obligations, meaning that the citizenship enforced the centralizing governmental 
power of the state through ”immediatization”4. However, even before 1789 another 
type of political membership existed: urban citizenship that was considered part 
of the old archaic privilege-based society, and that was withered away by national 
citizenship, despite the fact that national citizenship inherited some important 
characteristics of urban citizenship. As a national revolution, the French Revolution 
aimed to create a nation of equal individuals by ditching the internal boundaries, 
and at the same time by enforcing the external ones, which differentiated the French 
from the Other. In this respect, the French Revolution, as well as the 1848 European 
revolutions, were revolutions of the Otherness, emphasizing the concreteness and 
idiosyncratic character of each people. The French Revolution did not invent only 
the citizen, but also the foreigner5. Citizenship engendered in Brubaker’s opinion 
both the modern nation-state and modern nationalism, as it created civil equality, 
but also the ideological substance of nationalism, the concept of nation6. Ever since, 
debates flourished on how broad or narrow the definition of citizenship should 
be. The imposition of an equal membership brought another problem in the mind 
of nineteenth century philosophers: that of social dissolution that came with the 
exercise of popular sovereignty. In this respect, Emmanuel-Joseph Sieyès proposed a 
categorization of citizenship, in passive and active citizens7. Only active citizens were 
to retain political rights, while passive citizens (women, children and foreigners) were 
to have only natural and civil rights. The Terror can be also conceived as a attempt to 
stop the division of the popular will and of the republic. Carl Schmitt also feared that 
social pluralism would undermine the political unity necessary to democracy. The 
1 See Arash ABIZADEH, ”Democratic Theory...cit.”.
2 Rogers BRUBAKER, Citizenship and Nationhood... cit., p. 35.
3 Ibidem, p. 39.
4 Ibidem, p. 49.
5 Ibidem. 
6 Ibidem, p. 48.
7 Immanuel WALLERSTEIN, ”Citizens All? Citizens Some! The Making of the Citizen”, 
Comparative Studies in Society and History, vol. 45, no. 4, October 2003, p. 651.
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problem nowadays with multiple citizenship is the same: how to maintain the social 
cohesion of the political community, that is a prerequisite of democracy, in the context 
in which national citizenship is no longer conceived in absolute and exclusive terms.
The rise of the nation-state and of democracy was made possible by the fact 
that national membership gained supremacy over other types of membership 
(religious identity, class identity, regional identity). The rise of multiple citizenship 
affects precisely this supremacy of the national membership that is the citizenship. If 
individuals have different identities at the same time, why shouldn’t they hold several 
national identities? We enter here into the debate on the theory of multiple identities 
and on the nature of citizenship per se. In this reasoning, one should however consider 
that the multiple identities of an individual are different in kind – social identity, 
political identity, sexual identity – however one cannot have multiple identities of 
the same kind – one is either male or female, either leftist or rightist – these identities 
are exclusive categories. Moreover, the supremacy of citizenship is questioned by 
associating it with other types of identities. In his critique of pluralistic theory, Schmitt 
emphasized the fact that if we consider the state a mere association, similar with trade 
unions or churches, we deny its ethical role and its capacity to represent the people1. 
National membership is not another type of identity: it is central to our life as social 
human beings who accomplish their existence by their membership to the demos. As 
Joseph Carens observes, the other types of communities that stem from other identities 
besides the national one are not political communities that is ”groups that posses (or 
aspire to) extensive self government”2, and their members ”do not normally think of 
themselves as citizens of these sorts of groups”3. The difference between citizenship 
and other types of identities is not only in degree, but also in kind, as 
”to be defined as a citizen is not to qualify as an insider for a particular instance 
or type of interaction; it is to be defined in a general, abstract, enduring and 
context-independent way as a member of the state”4. 
This difference of kind, and the very nature of citizenship as an ontological status 
is denied by postnationalists. 
It is a mistake to regard citizenship as a mere legal status that links an individual 
to a state. As Charles Tilly argues, citizenship can be seen as 
”an organized set of social ties: rights and obligations connecting people who fall 
under the power of a particular state with the agents of that state. In citizenship, 
those rights and obligations apply broader to whole categories of persons rather 
than varying from one individual to the next”5.
1 Chantal MOUFFE, The Paradox...cit., p. 52.
2 Joseph CARENS, Culture, Citizenship and Community. A Contextual Exploration of Justice as 
Evenhandedness, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000, p. 167.
3 Ibidem.
4 Rogers BRUBAKER, Citizenship and Nationhood…cit., p. 29.
5 Charles TILLY, Identities, Boundaries and Social Ties, Paradigm Publishers, London, 2005, 
p. 173.
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For Tilly citizenship is rooted in the transformation of social boundaries into 
political boundaries1. Thus, the conceptions of national boundaries influence also the 
boundaries of citizenship2. Citizenship was created as a particularising category: 
”A bundle of rights and obligations actually distinguishes a whole category 
of the state’s subject population defined by their relation to the state rather than 
by the category’s place in the population’s general system of inequality”3.
By undermining the particularizing capacity, multiple citizenship is an attack on 
the very essence of the citizenship.
Nation and State-Building 
as Boundary-Building Processes
One of the major authors who addressed the relationship between citizenship 
and the nation is Rogers Brubaker, in his book, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and 
Germany. As we will further see, multiple citizenship is essentially and radically at odds 
with the definition Brubaker gives to the nation. This is so because he postulates two 
attributes of the nation that are undermined by multiple citizenship: its boundedness 
and its exclusivity. Brubaker considers citizenship a fundamental instrument of ”social 
closure”4 between states, as well as within states. This entails that the state is not neutral, 
as it operates important distinctions between its members and aliens, reserving certain 
rights to certain individuals, by virtue of their membership to the nation. As we will 
further see in the part dedicated to border ethics, this discrimination between foreigners 
and citizens that seems at odds with the liberal democratic principles, is at the same 
time the foundation of democracies as we know them. Furthermore, states are built and 
legitimated by the assumption that they further the interests of ”a particular bounded 
citizenry”5. Brubaker emphasizes precisely the developments of the ”division of the 
world’s population into a set of bounded and mutually exclusive citizenries” that went 
hand in hand with the ”division of the earth surface into a set of bounded and mutually 
exclusive territorial jurisdictions”6. The existence of bounded national communities should 
not be taken for granted, especially in present days that see the emergence of new forms 
of membership like multiple citizenship, which were for a long time forbidden, precisely 
for being ”degenerate”, in the sense that they do not converge with our understanding of 
concepts such as the nation, the state and democracy, that played a role in the state- and 
nation-building processes in Europe. Brubaker puts it very nice and simple: 
”As a powerful instrument of social closure, citizenship occupies a central 
place in the administrative structure and political culture of the modern nation-
state and state system”7. 
1 Ibidem, pp. 173-174.
2 Ibidem, p. 175.
3 Ibidem, p. 193.
4 Rogers BRUBAKER, Citizenship and Nationhood…cit., p. x.
5 Ibidem.
6 Ibidem, p. 22.
7 Ibidem, p. 23.
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The debasement of citizenship through the phenomenon of multiple citizenship 
means that citizenship is nowadays seen as a simple legal status among others and 
that it loses the social and cultural dimension. This development cannot but affect 
negatively the quality of democracy, by separating rights and duties from values 
and beliefs. Democracy and politics cannot exist without a normative dimension. 
The normative dimension of democracy is very well illustrated by the condemnation 
of the low turnout at elections. There is an overall consensus that electoral apathy 
challenges democracy. This is why, in some countries voting is mandatory. What good 
is to have the right to vote, if no one bothers to go to vote? If the right to vote is not 
valued per se then it loses its legitimacy and its reason for being. Moreover, citizenship 
is no longer an instrument and an object of closure as it was conceived1, as multiple 
citizenship does not delimitate distinct political and cultural communities.
By analogy to Rokkan’s work, the concept of boundary is replaced with that of 
closure in Brubaker’s work, notion borrowed from Max Weber’s distinction between 
open and closed social relationships. Although citizenship is internally inclusive, it 
excludes the foreigners, despite being part of the permanent resident population, 
because they are members of other states. Thus citizenship is not ”a mere reflex of 
residence”2. Multiple citizenship contradicts this logic, as the particularity and the 
boundedness of nations are no longer a rule. In this respect, the dissolution or the 
weakening of national ties affects automatically the state and its legitimacy. The fact 
that the existence and the legitimacy of states are based on the assumption that they 
further the interests of one particular and exclusive community, is very well 
demonstrated by the fact that logics as that of the two German states, ”two states, one 
nation”, are meant to fail in the long run, if the populations are nationally homogenous. 
The disintegration of multinational states, like Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, which 
failed to create a stable Yugoslav and Czechoslovak national identity that could 
supersede in time the identities of the composing national communities, as in the 
Swiss case, is relevant for the same idea. In Czechoslovakia, the Czechoslovakness 
was not embraced by the Slovaks. This identity could not coexist with the Slovakness 
of a part of the citizens, which proves that national identity is exclusive. Although as 
postnationalists claim, the ideal of the nation-state no longer holds in a globalizing 
world, and nation and state are not perfectly coextensive, almost all modern states 
claim to be nation-states, subscribe to the doctrines of national or popular sovereignty 
and derive state power and exercise it in the name of a people, namely a nation3. 
Distinctiveness of the nation is essential for the states, just as boundedness is. Exclusion 
of the foreigners especially from political rights, embodies very well the founding 
doctrines of the modern states, as well as nurtures the state’s legitimacy, as expression 
of the interests of a distinctive political community. However, multiple citizens hold 
political rights in more than one country, which means that at least for one country, 
they are at the same time citizens and aliens. This dual nature or dual personality 
(although individuals can hold even more than two citizenships) can be seen as an 
infringement of the founding doctrines of the states. Moreover, the two categories 
engendered by the French Revolution, the citizen and the foreigner, were created as 
1 Ibidem.
2 Ibidem, p. 21.
3 Ibidem, p. 28.
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”correlative, mutually exclusive, exhaustive categories”1, attributes that are no longer 
present in the logic of multiple citizenship, a ”third way” that was not meant to exist. 
Thus, as Brubaker states, the discrimination between members and non-members is 
the expression of a “normal, legitimate, rational, nationalism”2. However, the closure-
character of the national citizenship established by the French Revolution was 
inherited in great part from another type of membership: urban citizenship that was 
the first to set boundaries between aliens and residents, and the first instrument to 
enforce the territorial boundaries of the cities, as well limiting the access of unwanted 
guests. As an instrument to control immigration, and especially the entry of migrant 
poor, urban citizenship was present throughout Europe and especially in the city-belt 
area that saw the development of prosperous urban communities. Urban closure 
against beggars and unwanted individuals worked in two ways: the foreign poor 
were excluded from the town, and the potentially poor were excluded from urban 
citizenship. Urban citizenship was an instrument of social regulation just as much as 
national citizenship, and it was salient especially in countries like the Dutch Republic, 
where already at the end of the 18th century, 35% of the population was living in the 
cities3. Inhabitants used to complain to the city authorities that the poor impoverish 
the welfare institutions4. Moreover, certain restrictions were put to their access to the 
welfare institutions. For example, in the Netherlands, one could be treated in a Great 
Hospital only after ten years of residence, whereas after fifteen years, one could have 
access to the municipal welfare institutions5. Even when national citizenship was 
established by the Batavian republic, the constitution excluded from political rights 
and citizenship certain categories that were economically ”challenged”, like bankrupts 
and those who benefitted from ecclesiastical or public welfare, or living in welfare 
institutions6. Even today, economic independence is a condition for naturalization, 
like in Denmark, where in 2005 the amendment of the citizenship law provides that 
applicants for naturalization must have been self-sufficient without receiving welfare 
benefits for four of the previous five years7. In order to avoid homeless people, the 
states began to regulate more and more urban citizenship, challenging urban 
autonomy. Especially in Prussia, in the 19th century, the conflict over the control of 
membership, and therefore immigration, was very sharp8. As states took over the 
responsibility towards the poor, the conflicts between communes were replaced by 
disputes between states. The policies against the poor affected also the Roma 
population. In the 16th century, in the German Empire, the local rulers were forbidden 
to issue passports for the gypsies9, and later in the 19th century, all gypsies that could 
1 Ibidem, p. 46.
2 Ibidem, p. 28.
3 Maarten PRAK, ”Burghers into Citizens: Urban and National Citizenship in the 
Netherlands During the Revolution Era (c. 1800)”, Theory and Society, vol. 26, 1997, p. 415.
4 Ibidem, p. 408.
5 Ibidem.
6 Ibidem, p. 412.
7 Eva ERSBØLL, ”Denmark”, in Rainer BAUBOCK, Eva ERSBOLL, Kees GROENENDIJK, 
Harald WALDRAUCH (eds.), Acquisition and Loss of Nationality. Policies and Trends in 15 European 
countries, vol. 2 (Country Analyses), Amsterdam University Press, Amsterdam, 2006, p. 132.
8 Rogers BRUBAKER, Citizenship and Nationhood…cit., p. 65.
9 Helmut SAMER, ”16th-18th Century”, ROMBASE, Didactically edited information on Roma, 
http://romani.uni-graz.at/rombase (last consulted on 22.04.2009).
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not prove their German citizenship beyond all doubt, could be deported1. Several 
bilateral treaties with other European powers (Austrian Hungarian Empire, Russia, 
France, Italy, Denmark, the Netherlands and Luxembourg) were signed to ease this 
task2. An embryonic institution of citizenship arose from the bilateral and multilateral 
treaties between states, in order to limit the costs of unwanted poor, in an effort to 
rationalize and coordinate expulsion practices3. As Brubaker points out, the action of 
states against the migrant poor, and the construction of a unitary sovereignty, 
emphasize the saliency of the connection between citizenship and state-building4. 
Thus, Brubaker’s theory emphasizes the dimension of the state, not only as territorial 
organization, but as a membership association that operates using categories of 
exclusion and inclusion. It is this dimension that is most weakened by the mushrooming 
of multiple citizenship. Already, urban citizenship provided certain benefits to its 
beholder. For example, in the Netherlands at the end of the 18th century, there were 
three obvious advantages of citizenship: membership in the guilds that had the 
monopole on trade, and that were as well represented in the local government, access 
to political office, and the fact that the citizen could only be put on trial by a local 
court5. By now, multiple urban citizenship was considered problematic. One example 
in this respect, is that of an individual accused of murdering a Jew in Amsterdam, 
mentioned by Maarten Prak. Although he was a citizen of Amsterdam, he provided 
proof that he was a citizen of Bois-le-Duc too, in order to avoid extradition and trial in 
Amsterdam6. National citizenship reversed also the logic between membership and 
residence. Membership was no longer dependent on residence, rather residence was 
contingent on membership7. However, if we consider the fact that the cases of multiple 
citizenship arise subsequently to immigration and long-time residence in another 
country (one of the criteria for naturalization), and not only from cases of jus sanguinis 
a patre et a matre, we could argue that multiple citizenship is a return to the principle 
of domicilium facit subditum. Today the behaviour of nation-states seems rather similar 
to that of the communes. As the communes wanted to protect the communal life, and 
the communal spirit, the nation-states want to reserve the welfare benefits only for 
their citizens, and to maintain the necessary level of solidarity and cohesion. As we 
have shown, citizenship emerged also from the regulation of migration. Today mass 
migration seems less controlled by the means of citizenship, if we think of two 
phenomena: the emergence of European citizenship, and the extensive acceptance by 
nationality laws of multiple citizenship. 
Democratization as the extension of civil and political rights was intimately 
linked to the processes of nation-building. The attack on the nation, as a consequence 
of extensive emigration and liberalization of citizenship policies, hampers also 
democracy in itself, and the expression of popular sovereignty. Stein Rokkan rightly 
observed that, the end of the Völkerwanderung in the High Middle Ages, permitted 
1 IDEM, ”Gypsy Policies in Germany. From the 19th Century to the Foundation of the Third 
Reich”, ROMBASE, Didactically edited information on Roma, http://romani.uni-graz.at/rombase 
(last consulted on 22.04.2009).
2 Ibidem.
3 Rogers BRUBAKER, Citizenship and Nationhood…cit., p. 69.
4 Ibidem, p. 71.
5 Maarten PRAK, ”Burghers into Citizens...cit.”, pp. 405-406.
6 Ibidem, p. 406.
7 Rogers BRUBAKER, Citizenship and Nationhood…cit., p. 70.
497
Romanian Political Science Review • vol. X • no. 3 • 2010
Multiple Citizenship, Nation and Democracy
the state and nation formation, in the sense that the ethno-linguistic infrastructure 
stabilised1. Today, the stability of the nation-state is under the attack of another wave 
of Völkerwanderung, as the result of extensive transnational migration in Europe, 
that triggers transformations of the states, towards greater political and social 
disintegration. As we will see, the processes of nation-building are intimately linked 
with the process of democratization and state-building. In a nutshell, the Nation-
State was and is, par excellence, the locus of the expression of popular sovereignty of a 
community of citizenship, linked by a common destiny – the nation. Stein Rokkan is 
one of the scholars who focussed his study on the relation between democracy and the 
nation. Central to the work of Stein Rokkan is the concept of boundary-building. The 
importance of this concept supports our argument that the dissolution of boundaries, 
territorially, culturally and politically, can affect the exercise of democracy, as 
the principle of exclusion, of boundary, lays at the core of the democratic modern 
state that was framed as such, as a social closure, able to support the expression of 
popular sovereignty of the nation. For Rokkan, structuring and boundary-building 
are the processes that permitted the formation of political-territorial, economic and 
cultural systems2. Boundary-building was linked to four processes of functional 
differentiation: economic-technological, military-administrative, judicial-legislative 
and religious-symbolic differentiation3. The processes of boundary-building, as 
expressed by state and nation-building and the process of democratization, linked 
to these processes, are translated by Rokkan into three general terms: exit, voice and 
loyalty, borrowed from Hirschman’s Exit, Voice and Loyalty (1970). ”Exit” refers to the 
state-building process of external boundaries, while ”voice” refers to democratization 
processes. ”Loyalty” is designated for the study of nation-building. Rokkan conceives 
the process of democratization as a dismantling of internal boundaries4, of inclusion 
and levelling, by the means of national citizenship. However, citizenship strengthens 
also the external boundaries of the political community. For Rokkan, the nation-state 
is the only political framework able to ensure the control over a territory. He stresses 
the fact that cultural systems, as well as economic system, despite having a territorial 
dimension, are different not only in degree, but also in kind, from the nation-state. 
Moreover, if there is no congruence between the cultural, economic and territorial 
political systems, problems of boundary-control may arise. These problems cause 
conflicts over resources and may lead to the reconfiguration of boundaries as well5, 
in terms of relaxation or strengthening (the European integration process illustrates 
very well Rokkan’s arguments in this sense). The processes of nation-building are 
often intertwined with those of democratization, because membership to the nation 
is seen as an equal type of membership able to transcend social division. Rokkan 
argued that democratization was often a strategy of national unification6, such as 
in the case of the introduction of universal male suffrage in 1871, in the German 
Reich. However, national unification by the means of democratization worked only 
1 Peter FLORA, ”Introduction and Interpretation”, in Stein ROKKAN, State Formation, 
Nation-Building and Mass Politics in Europe. The Theory of Stein Rokkan, ed. by Peter FLORA, Stein 
KUHNLE, Derek URWIN, Oxford University Press. New York, 1999, p. 66.
2 Ibidem, p. 5.
3 Stein ROKKAN, State Formation...cit., p. 341.
4 Peter FLORA, „Introduction...cit.”, p. 9.
5 Ibidem.
6 Ibidem, p. 26.
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in cases of cultural homogeneity, as in the German and Danish cases for example. 
Both countries experienced an early state-formation and became unitary nation-states 
thanks to their ethnic homogeneity. The processes of democratization are linked not 
only to state-building, but also to the cultural boundary-building or nation-building. 
Thus, Protestant nationalisation favoured political mobilization from below (like in 
Denmark), through the nationalisation of the Church, and through early literacy1. 
This consideration refers to the linguistic unification underlying nation-building. 
Nation-building as a boundary-building process (consisting of linguistic and religious 
unification, by the means of a national educational system, and often by the means 
of an established church) is considered in some of Rokkan’s writings, as the second 
phase in the development of nation-states, preceding the democratization phase, and 
the creation of Welfare systems2. They constitute sequences of change from the feudal 
order to the modern one. Political systems are marked by two types of boundaries: 
territorial boundaries and social boundaries. Citizenship is the most important type 
of social boundary. Rokkan realized that the extension of citizenship rights was not 
only a response to class conflict (like for T.H. Marshall) but also a solution to cope with 
other types of cleavages, like the cultural and territorial ones3. Increased migration, 
European integration and the presence of secessionist movements all across the globe, 
show that Rokkan’s theory, as well as other classical studies on nationalism and 
citizenship, are still pertinent as tools of analysis of present realities. In fact, today we 
face an overstretching of citizenship rights. The extension of rights was so radical that 
rights have been in fact decoupled from citizenship itself, as we can see in the case of 
European citizenship.
This linkage between nation-building and democracy is very well illustrated 
by the case of Denmark. In the 19th century, Denmark gradually developed into a 
homogenous nation-state, with a strong national identity provided by the congruence 
between language, people, nation and state4. After its loss of Schleswig-Holstein to 
Germany in 1864, the state concentrated on internal reforms, under the slogan ”outward 
losses must be made up by inward gains”5. These inward gains referred of course 
also to the expansion of civil rights at the beginning, and later on to the expansion of 
political rights. Despite the absolutist rule (that draw even an absolutist constitution, 
the Lex Regia), Denmark experienced a slow democratization process starting with 
1784, introducing reforms of the agrarian system, civil liberties and trade regulations6. 
The series of democratic reforms following military defeats, and territorial losses that 
created cultural homogeneity, aimed to enforce the state from within. According to 
Østergaard, this homogeneity empowered the peasant farmers that eventually gained 
hegemony over the nationalistic discourse7. Not surprisingly, in the 19th century the 
1 Ibidem, p. 33.
2 Ibidem, p. 58.
3 Ibidem, p. 69.
4 Uffe ØSTERGAARD, ”Paradox and Dilemma – Danish National Identity Between 
Multinational Heritage and Small State Nationalism”, in Hans BRENNER, Morten KELSTRUP 
(eds.), Denmark’s Policy towards Europe After 1945: History, Theory, Options, Odense University 
Press, Odense, 2000, http://www.diis.dk/graphics/CVer/Personlige_CVer/Holocaust_and_
Genocide/uffe_Paradox_Dilemma.pdf , p. 3 (last consulted on 22.03.2010).
5 Ibidem, p. 13.
6 Ibidem, pp. 6-7.
7 Ibidem, p. 7.
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nationality law of 1776, the Infødsret Act was modified by the first Danish Constitution 
of 1849, and after the loss of Schleswig-Holstein, which increased the homogenization 
of the population1. Thus, in 1871 Denmark renounced to the doctrine of perpetual 
allegiance, the Danes losing their Infødsret, upon naturalization in another country2. 
What is more, in 1898, a reform introduced citizenship based on jus sanguinis3. The 
relationship between nationality and democracy is illustrated by the fact that, in 
many countries, the democratic developments during the 18th and 19th centuries, 
were accompanied by modifications of the nationality laws. The new legislations 
either created a new type of membership, the national citizenship that superseded 
urban types of membership, like in the Netherlands – where the Batavian Republic 
created in the spirit of the French Revolution a new category of people, the citizens 
of the Netherlands, to replace the Stadtbürger4 – or modified the existing legislation 
elevating the status of subject to that of citizen, like in Denmark. In the Netherlands, 
new ideas about citizenship emerged during the 1770s and 1780s, in the period known 
as the Democratic Revolution, fomented by the Patriot movement that was repressed 
in 1787. This new model of national participatory citizenship, was inspired by the 
British Enlightenment5, whose ideas benefitted from a free political press, as much as 
in Denmark, the first country to officially declare the freedom of the press in 17706. The 
Patriots linked the debate on citizenship also with the tradition of republicanism and 
constitutionalism7. The model of national citizenship will be successfully put forward 
by the Batavian Republic, in several successive forms of the new Constitution. The 
Constitution proclaimed the exclusivity and primacy of the bond between the citizen 
and the Dutch state and nation, as those who lived in another country, those ”in the 
service of a foreign power, either ecclesiastical or secular or receiving pensions from 
such powers” and ”members of foreign corporations that require their members to 
take an oath”8 were deprived from voting rights and citizenship. All sorts of multiple 
allegiance were condemned and loyalty was not taken for granted, not to speak of 
multiple citizenship that was unconceivable.
According to Rokkan, all territorial structures use boundary-building strategies 
that can be seen in the interactions between two spaces: the geographical and the 
membership spaces, each characterized by a type of distance – physical in the case of 
the first, social and cultural in the case of the second9. The two spaces can be studied 
by reference to external boundary-building and to internal boundary-building. 
In Rokkan’s theory, boundary-building is entrenched in the history of the human 
societies, starting with the primordial communities10. The concern with boundaries 
remained with the establishment of cities that ”developed strong boundaries for 
differentiated control of transactions”11. In time, physical and biological boundaries 
1 Eva ERSBØLL, ”Denmark”, cit., pp. 105-106.
2 Ibidem, p. 110.
3 Ibidem, p. 113.
4 Maarten PRAK, ”Burghers into Citizens…cit.”, p. 411.
5 Ibidem, p. 410.
6 See John Christian LAURSEN, ”David Hume and the Danish Debate About Freedom of 
the Press in the 1770s”, Journal of the History of Ideas, vol. 58, no. 1, January 1998, pp. 167-168.
7 Maarten PRAK, “Burghers into Citizens…cit.”, p. 410.
8 Ibidem, p. 412.
9 Stein ROKKAN, State Formation…cit., p. 104.
10 Ibidem, p. 105.
11 Ibidem.
500
Romanian Political Science Review • vol. X • no. 3 • 2010
ANA-MARIA TANAŞOCA
have been replaced by the social boundary that is the citizenship. Several ”boundary-
reinforcing developments”1 contributed to the creation of the nation-state: the military 
reforms and technologies and the printing technologies (or print capitalism in Benedict 
Anderson’s terms2) merged the concept of citizenship with that of territorial identity, 
in other words, forging the nations. Another development, this time, ”boundary 
reductive”3 added up: capitalism. Rokkan manages to underline the importance of 
some factors in boundary-building that will be later developed into major theories on 
nation-building (the theories of Ernest Gellner and of Benedict Anderson). Rokkan 
traced a typology of boundary-defining processes that characterised the emergence 
of nation-states: territorial centre-building, cultural boundary-building and economic 
boundary-building4. The configuration of these processes and their timing sets the 
conditions for democratization (voice). Thus, from Rokkan’s theory, we cannot separate 
the concept of boundary and exclusiveness from the modern state and from democracy 
itself. In the present context of the dissolution of boundaries, the question is how will 
the democratic states cope with this situation on the long term, and if major changes 
will be brought to the state-system and to the democratic regimes as we know them.
The concept of boundary in state-formation in also central in the work of Joel 
Migdal. Migdal observes that little was said of the relationship between boundaries 
and sovereignty and about the political and cultural meanings attached to them5. Little 
emphasis was put on the feeling of belonging that underlies borders and boundaries. 
Borders and boundaries usually are built upon this feeling of belonging. Without it, 
social and political disintegration occurs, and all nation-building processes fail. The 
recent literature on citizenship illustrates very well this trend, together with numerous 
studies on sovereignty, transnationalism, European integration and globalization, 
arguing that boundaries are impermanent structures, dependent on certain contexts6. 
Thus citizenship, a status that consecrated these boundaries is the first to lose its 
importance and to be decoupled from a sense of belonging, remaining just another 
identity, subject to the rational calculus of costs and benefits of the individual, that 
are translated in the case of citizenship in terms of duties and rights. Are we facing 
a desacralization of citizenship with the increased instrumentalization of it? Doesn’t 
this profanation of national citizenship affect democracy in itself? Isn’t the symbolic 
dimension of citizenship and the prestige of this membership lost?
Boundaries designate exclusive spaces of particularity, because they 
”signify the point at which something becomes something else, at which the way 
things are done changes, at which ’we’ end and ’they’ begin, at which certain 
rules for behaviour no longer obtain and others take hold”7. 
1 Ibidem, p. 106.
2 Benedict ANDERSON, Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism, Verso, London and New York, 1991, pp. 37-46.
3 Stein ROKKAN, State Formation…cit., p. 106.
4 Ibidem, p. 229.
5 Joel S. MIGDAL, ”Mental Maps and Virtual Checkpoints. Struggles to Construct and 
Maintain State and Social Boundaries”, in IDEM (ed.), Boundaries and Belonging, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2004, p. 3.
6 Ibidem, p. 4.
7 Ibidem.
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Nations and states design spaces of membership that express particularities. The 
exclusiveness of such spaces expresses precisely this idiosyncratic character that is 
part of their raison d’être. Migdal isolates two constitutive elements of boundaries: 
checkpoints and mental maps1. Checkpoints are used to enforce separation and are an 
indicator of membership and usually use rewards and sanctions. Citizenship acts as 
such a checkpoint, as a boundary marker. The mental maps refer to the construction of 
boundaries in the collective mind. They contain representations of the boundaries, the 
emotions and loyalties they evoke, and other frames of interpretation. Checkpoints 
and mental maps use categories of inclusion/exclusion in order to enforce solidarity 
between groups. Mental maps are cognitive artefacts that emerge also in the nation-
building processes. Migdal emphasizes the fact that alterity is intrinsic to the human 
nature, and also to the nature of nations, and that it emerges from the need of security of 
the individuals2. Citizenship, as well as other categories such as language, skin colour, 
dress codes, separate the familiar from the unfamiliar, the latter being associated with 
insecurity. Of course these differences have been enforced discursively in times of war 
and conflict, as a means of legitimation. A good example is that given by the Yugoslav 
wars, during which a complex discourse on the differences between the Yugoslav 
peoples has been put forward, despite their living together for many years. Movements 
of self-determination use the same discursive logic, whether we speak of state-framed 
nationalism – as in the German case that emerged as a response against French 
nationalism – or counter-state nationalism3 – as in the case of the national movements 
inside the Habsburg Empire. Not surprisingly the independence of Slovakia revived 
the arguments for Slovak self-determination that were put forward already during the 
first Czechoslovak republic, and that emphasized precisely the differences between 
the two nations. As the boundaries of the state coexist with different boundaries 
between groups, inside the state, it is no surprise that, at times, these boundaries tend 
to clash. Moreover, the official boundaries, like citizenship, are contested and often 
reconstructed. The contestation of boundaries can result in a war (like in the Yugoslav 
case), or can take non-violent forms, such as the demands of various national minorities 
or immigrants. Citizenship is not only an essential status of the individual’s life, but 
it configures a space of safety, namely the state4. Multiple citizenship constitutes a 
challenge and a contestation of modern boundaries. It consecrates the existence of 
overlapping communities of belonging that were supposed to be mutually exclusive. 
Thus, multiple citizenship is one of the developments marking the dissociation of 
citizenship from the national identity. It is no longer pointing to membership to a 
nation, it is no longer an identity. It is a mere legal status, amongst others. Citizenship 
was conceived as a status aiming to maintain the separation of a state from the rest 
of the international milieu, but also the separation between state and society, the two 
contracting parties of the social-political contract5. This distinction between state and 
society is at least in part, abolished by the nation-building processes and nationalism. 
1 Ibidem, p. 6.
2 Ibidem, p. 10.
3 The two concepts are coined in Rogers BRUBAKER, ”The Manichean Myth: Rethinking 
the Distinction Between ’Civic’ and ’Ethnic’ Nationalism”, in Hanspeter KRIESI et al (eds.), 
Nation and National Identity: The European Experience in Perspective, Ruegger, Zürich, 1999, 
pp. 55-71.
4 Joel S. MIGDAL, ”Mental Maps...cit.”, p. 16.
5 Ibidem, p. 18.
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These processes have strived to enforce the individuals’ loyalty to the political 
units, by popularizing a whole state ideology that rests on the principle of popular 
sovereignty, which places the people above the state. In this respect, states have 
always sought to make coincide the political boundaries with the social-psychological 
ones, or the mental maps of the individuals1. Obviously this goal is becoming harder 
to achieve in the context of globalization, and the expansion of multiple citizenship 
illustrates very well the appearance of a Cinderella-shoe complex: the boundaries of 
the political of the states are too tight to accommodate the social-psychological ones 
that are becoming more denationalized. As Migdal argues, sometimes overlapping 
boundaries and mental maps can be accommodated, but more often they ”tear people 
in different directions”2. Thus, multiple citizenship is one of the 
”varying systems of status”3 that ”hit up against one another, forcing people to 
create a hierarchy inducting them to choose which boundaries, principles, and 
practices to submit to and which to violate [...] It is in such situations that one 
finds the sites of social struggle and social change”4. 
The Symbolic Dimension of Citizenship
States are characterized by a certain set of practices that consecrate their 
boundaries and their particularities among other actors of the international arena. 
The checking of passports at the frontiers is such a practice that has a symbolic 
dimension. The fact that border guards from the checkpoints wear guns to limit the 
free movements of individuals symbolizes the monopole of the state over legitimate 
coercion, as expression of the sovereignty of the people to control the flow of aliens 
on its territory. Oaths of allegiance upon naturalization are also an expression of 
the symbolic dimension of citizenship. They emphasize that trust lies at the very 
foundation of democracy. As we have seen, the theories on state- and nation- building 
emphasize the saliency of values, such as trust and solidarity, that must be endorsed 
by individuals through cognitive processes that define and redefine the Familiar and 
the Other. Oaths of allegiance are present already in ancient Athens, where every man 
reaching 20 years was registered and had to swear an oath5. Some European countries 
have introduced citizenship ceremonies following the example of the US. Although 
the symbolic dimension has decreased over the last century, being affected by the 
overall devaluation of national citizenship, we must not forget that the symbolic of 
citizenship points out to the saliency of the state as membership association. Already 
in the 17th century, the urban citizenship, predecessor of national citizenship, was 
endowed with an important symbolic dimension. In the Netherlands, citizenship was 
confirmed by the swearing of an oath in the hands of the magistrates, in which the 
individual promised its loyalty to the States-General, to the stadholder and to the city 
1 Ibidem, p. 19.
2 Ibidem, p. 23.
3 Ibidem.
4 Ibidem.
5 According to Denis DIDEROT and Jean D’ALEMBERT, L’Encyclopédie ou Dictionnaire 
raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers, entry ”citoyen”, available online http://www.
lexilogos.com/encyclopedie_diderot_alembert.htm (last consulted on 10.01.2010).
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of course1. The individual swore to ”remain loyal to my co-citizens, until death do us 
part”2. This form of the oath that is very similar to a rite of passage, consecrated the 
entry in a sacred union, quite similar to that of marriage3. The last part of the oath 
depicts urban citizenship as the link to the city that often passes through death and 
sacrifice. The special relation between the citizen and its town was underscored also 
by other symbolic gestures. As fires were a great danger to the towns of that period, 
medals of honour were handed to those who changed the facades of their house from 
wooden into stone4. Another ritual was that the new citizens present a fire-basket to 
the town where there were no professional fire brigades5. The loyalty clause contained 
by citizenship was perpetuated during the Batavian Republic, as every citizen who 
registered to vote agreed to renounce to ”all relations with other nationals and to 
belong to no other than the Dutch Republic”6. This oath emphasizes the exclusivity 
and particularity of the bond between the citizen and the state and nation and rejects 
all forms of multiple allegiance including citizenship. At the same time it proclaims 
the sovereign nation as the source of political rights. Multiple citizenship undermines 
the symbolic dimension of citizenship. It constitutes in this respect, a desacralization, a 
profanation of the special bond between State and citizen and between the co-citizens. 
As citizenship becomes just another status among many others, some states decided 
however to maintain citizenship ceremonies. The UK started to hold ceremonies since 
2004, as stated in the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act of 2002. Before the 
introduction of the ceremony, the applicant also had to swear an oath, but all was 
done by bureaucratic means. The ceremonies contain speeches of local incumbents 
and an oath of allegiance in which the individual swears as follows: 
”I will give my loyalty to the United Kingdom and respect its rights and 
freedoms. I will uphold its democratic values. I will observe its laws faithfully 
and fulfil my duties and obligations as a British citizen”7. 
The Netherlands and France also reintroduced ceremonies in 2003 and 20068. 
The Netherlands introduced in 2009 also a declaration of solidarity to accompany 
the citizenship ceremony9. Denmark also introduced a voluntary ceremony upon 
1 Maarten PRAK, ”Burghers into Citizens...cit.”, p. 405.
2 Ibidem.
3 Dual citizenship was in fact associated with bigamy. George Bancroft considered that 
the logic behind the repudiation of bigamy and that behind the repudiation of dual citizenship 
are the same. See Rey KOSLOWSKI, ”Demographic Boundary Maintenance in World Politics: 
Of International Norms on Dual Nationality”, in Mathias ALBERT, David JACOBSON, Yosef 
LAPID (eds.), Identities, Borders, Orders, Borderlines series, vol. 18, University of Minneapolis 
Press, Minneapolis, 2001, p. 206.
4 Maarten PRAK, ”Burghers into Citizens...cit.”, p. 406.
5 Ibidem.
6 Ibidem, p. 412.
7 Maarten VINK, Gerard René de GROOT, ”Citizenship Attribution in Western Europe. 
International Framework and Domestic Trends”, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, vol. 36, 
no. 5, 2010, online version http://www.fdcw.unimaas.nl/staff/files/users/215/Vink%20
and%20De%20Groot_JEMS.pdf, p. 23 (last consulted on 27.05.2010).
8 Ibidem.
9 Ricky van ŒRS, Betty de HART, Kees GROENENDIJK, ”Report on the Netherlands”, April 
2010, EUDO Citizenship Observatory, European University Institute, available online http://
eudo-citizenship.eu/docs/CountryReports/Netherlands.pdf (last consulted on 25.05.2010).
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naturalization in 2005. Moreover, the applications for naturalization are included into 
a bill on naturalization that is submitted each year to the Folketing which has to vote 
the bill1 as a symbol that each naturalization represents the will of the people to enlarge 
its membership. In 2006, the Presidium of the Parliament organized a celebration for 
the new citizens on a day that was declared a nationality day (26 March)2. This fact 
shows the important symbolic dimension of citizenship that differentiates it from 
other types of identity, despite its erosion by the globalization processes.
National Citizenship and Liberalism: 
The Liberal-Nationalist Stance
Multiple citizenship has been long regarded by jurists as a source of conflicting 
loyalties that undermines the states. However, the conflict is not only one of loyalties, 
it can be also a cultural type of conflict. This is because the particularity of nations 
is not only expressed by ethnicity, but is most visible in terms of culture. Nations 
are cultural artefacts, therefore citizenship is more than a legal status. It subsumes 
loyalty to a set of values and principles that have become nationalized, as part of a 
process that potentiates the authenticity and incommensurability of each political 
community. The purification of culture, through authentication which leads to 
exclusion, the universalization of uniqueness through nation-building have been part 
of the emergence of modern polities according to Anthony D. Smith3. By dissolving 
the boundaries of membership, multiple citizenship undermines the concreteness 
and particularity of the nation for the sake of a promised cosmopolitan citizenship, 
and of a cosmopolitan culture that despises in the end diversity and pluralism. 
Multiple citizenship is regarded also as the bastion of liberalism and of individual 
rights in battle with nationalism and communitarianism. However, we will show that 
democracy rests on the symbiosis of liberalism and nationalism and that multiple 
citizenship cannot be defendable from a liberal point of view. 
Contrary to postnationalists, liberal-nationalists emphasize the salience of 
national identity in the viability of liberal democracy. This stance is in opposition 
to the postnationalist one, according to which social and political integration can do 
without nationality. For liberal nationalists however democracy requires integration 
in a liberal national culture that is referred to as a contextual culture (Tamir) or a culture 
of choice (Kymlicka). Moreover, democratic institutions cannot function without a 
particular culture, against the theory of the neutral state. The impossibility to separate 
state and culture is contained by the concept of political culture. Yael Tamir argues, 
following Lucian Pye and Clifford Geertz, that the political institutions of a state are 
rooted in a particular national culture. Thus, political institutions are expressions of 
cultural identity4. Contrary to the postnationalist thesis on integration, that we can 
find in Habermas’s writings, the liberal nationalists treat cultural particularity in 
1 Eva ERSBØLL, ”Denmark”, cit., p. 139.
2 Ibidem.
3 Anthony D. SMITH, ”Culture, Community and Territory: The Politics of Ethnicity and 
Nationalism”, International Affairs, vol. 72, no. 3, 1996, p. 445.
4 Yael TAMIR, Liberal Nationalism, cit., p. 148.
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functionalist terms1. In his defence of the nation-state, David Miller underlines the 
particularly of the national identity in relation to other types of identities. He stresses 
the fact that the nation is a community of obligation, a moral community, based on 
mutual aid2. Moreover, nations are founded on the belief of the existence of common 
traits between individuals that differentiates them from other people3. These two 
characteristics of national identity are at odds with multiple citizenship that however 
could represent a challenge also for Habermas’s ”constitutional patriotism”, because 
multiple nationality entails split allegiance to different sets of political principles 
and institutions. Dominique Schnapper, for example, criticizes the abstract nature 
of ”constitutional patriotism” on the reason that it cannot develop integration and 
solidarity. Furthermore, the particularity and concreteness of a political community 
legitimates the very existence of states. According to Schnapper, the nation ”integrates 
the population in a community of citizens whose existence legitimizes the interior 
and exterior action of the state”4. Tamir also emphasizes that states ought to derive 
their legitimacy from a nation, as testified by the historical processes that saw the 
emergence of modern states5. Thus postnational integration that is embodied by 
multiple citizenship, could not be viable. This is because the national culture that 
embodies patterns of behaviour, social and political norms, language and symbols, 
enables mutual recognition6. This mutual recognition is used to separate members 
from non-members7. Increased migration, correlated with postnationalist integration, 
is likely to disturb the mutual recognition between members, as multiple citizenship 
legitimizes the existence of different, even antagonistic national cultures. In the next 
part, we will show that such postnational ”integration” is likely to cause problems. 
The dilemma with multiple citizenship can be formulated as follows: should 
citizenship reflect this moral dimension of the national identity? Or should it be just 
the result of an individual choice, as postnationalists argue? I start by saying that we 
cannot separate the individual life from the collective one. An individual cannot have 
rights and freedoms living alone, in isolation, in a state similar to the state of nature. 
If he was alone, he would not have need of rights and freedoms that come precisely 
from his relationship to the Other. Rights are needed to protect its own liberty in 
relation to the others. The presence of the Other is essential in this political equation. 
Rights and freedoms do not stem from the egotistic relation with the Self but from the 
social contact with the Other. The concept of rights and freedoms has no relevance in 
a context of social isolation, although the individual is the locus of these rights and 
freedoms. Our reasoning is convergent with the theory of the social contract in this 
matter. Rights and freedoms cannot be separated from the social and political state. 
This is why the humanitarian ethic cannot provide a base for political rights. The 
human nature of the individual that is manifested also in the apolitical state of nature 
does not result in a need for rights. The concept of individual exists in a dialectic with 
1 Arash ABIZADEH, ”Liberal Nationalist...cit.”, p. 239.
2 David MILLER, ”The Nation-State: A Modest Defence”, in Chris BROWN (ed.), Political 
Restructuring in Europe. Ethical Perspectives, Routledge, London and New York, 2005, p. 135.
3 Ibidem, p. 136.
4 Dominique SCHNAPPER, La communauté des citoyens. Sur l’idée moderne de nation, 
Gallimard Folio, Paris, 2003, p. 45.
5 Yael TAMIR, Liberal Nationalism, cit., p. 60.
6 Ibidem, p. 68.
7 Ibidem.
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the collective. This is why, when referring to individual rights, we refer to citizenship 
rights. The individual is the citizen, whereas humanity being a general category 
does not subsume rights and duties, because it does not entail a dialectic relation. 
Why should a human being have rights and freedom if humanity of all individuals 
does not constitute a possible conflict between human beings? As humanity does not 
really entail a particularity, it does not set the man apart from others, as individuality 
does, so why should it be a source of rights? Humanity cannot claim rights for a 
particular being; this would be possible only from the point of view of the relation 
between human beings and non-human animal beings. The dialectic relation with 
the animal nature, sets its particularity and makes it a source of human rights, that 
cannot be however of political nature, but at most of a moral nature1. Thus, against 
the postnationalist stance, the rights cannot be detached from the status of citizen and 
rooted in a humanistic nature of the individual. 
The middle ground in the liberal-communitarian debate is represented by the 
mixture of holism and individualism in Charles Taylor’s opinion, that is in fact 
proposed by liberal nationalism. According to this stance, national identity, if is 
imbued in liberal values, leads to an individualistic way of life. A liberal national 
contextual culture furthers individualistic values. This liberal national culture could 
be associated with what Charles Taylor consider to be a condition for a democratic 
society: a commonly recognized definition of the good life that he coins by the term of 
patriotism2. For Taylor common identities are necessary for democracy: 
”Since participatory self-government is itself usually carried out in 
common actions, it is perhaps normal to see it as properly animated by common 
identifications”3. 
The patriotism conceptualized by Taylor involves a love for the particular4, that 
is so hated by postnationalists. It also represents a ”common identification with a 
historical community founded on certain values”5. Because patriotism incorporates 
self-rule in its definition of freedom6, it follows that multiple citizenship as anti-
patriotic membership cannot be compatible with individual freedom.
Against the postnationalist and liberal egalitarian stances, Kymlicka argues that 
the restriction on citizenship, regarded as a group-differentiated right, is compatible 
with liberalism. The boundedness of the national membership is necessary both to 
protect the individual’s rights and freedoms and to protect the people’s cultural 
1 Individuals are endorsed with a moral status that has been denied to animals. This denial 
was justified in multiple ways by the Western philosophy, and especially by Christianity, that 
legitimated the exploitation and massacre of animals, by their humanistic ethic, that proclaimed 
human superiority in moral terms. However, the new field of animal ethics tries to present 
arguments for considering non-human beings as moral beings as well. 
2 Charles TAYLOR, ”Cross-purpose: the liberal-communitarian debate”, in IDEM, 
Philosophical Arguments, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, London, 1997, p. 182.
3 Ibidem, pp. 192-194.
4 Ibidem, p. 198.
5 Ibidem, p. 199.
6 Ibidem.
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membership1. The preservation of cultural membership is defendable from the liberal 
standpoint as 
”liberals implicitly assume that people are members of societal cultures, that 
these cultures provide the context for individual choice, and that one of the 
functions of having separate states is to recognize the fact that the people belong 
to separate cultures”2. 
Drawing on Rawls, Kymlicka posits that the more a culture is liberalized, the 
more the people are likely to share basic values with people in other liberal cultures 
and to reject traditional ways of life3. However, Kymlicka observes that cultural 
identification are still strong and it is unlikely for them to die out: 
”I suspect that the causes of this attachment lie deep in the human condition, 
tied up with the way humans as cultural creatures need to make sense of their 
world, and that a full explanation would involve aspects of psychology, sociology, 
linguistics, the philosophy of mind, and even neurology”4. 
Now, multiple citizenship illustrates the inability to transcend this ontological 
dimension of nationality, that is likely to affect integration. By preserving their birth 
citizenship upon naturalization, dual citizens refuse also to renounce to their cultural 
identity that however might subsume beliefs and values that are against the cultural 
background of their country of adoption. Kymlicka acknowledges the fact that open 
borders would lead to the disappearance of distinct national cultures5. As a product 
of open borders, multiple citizenship has every means of undermining cultural 
distinctiveness. If liberals take for granted the fact that freedom and equality is defined 
within a society and culture6, then migration gives rise to competing understandings of 
freedom and equality that cannot be accomplished each without sacrificing the cultural 
particularism of the states. By allowing multiple national allegiance, the states are 
sabotaging themselves because they accept such competing understandings of equality 
and freedom. This statement will be developed in the next part that will focus on some 
examples of this nature. Besides, as Kymlicka points out, if liberals are really committed 
to liberal principles they cannot endorse cultural membership uncritically7.
The cultural baggage of the citizenship is very well expressed by the French 
case. As Brubaker points out, ”while French nationhood if constituted by political 
unity, it is centrally expressed in the striving for cultural unity”8. This is why one 
major requirement for naturalization in France remains the proof of assimilation. 
Recently, the cultural and political unity of the French nation and state has been 
under the attack of the burqa. The case of the burqa or the integral Islamic veil is 
very suggestive as it gave rise to debates not only in France, but also in Belgium, 
1 Will KYMLICKA, Multicultural Citizenship...cit., p. 125.
2 Ibidem.
3 Ibidem, p. 87.
4 Ibidem, p. 90.
5 Ibidem, p. 93.
6 Ibidem.
7 Ibidem, p. 94.
8 Rogers BRUBAKER, Citizenship and Nationhood...cit., p. 1.
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the Netherlands, Denmark and Italy, as we will see in the next part. Despite that 
fact that many burqa wearers are citizens of these states, they seem to reject some 
important political values that lie at the basis of democracy in these countries. In this 
respect, the case of the burqa represents a disruption of the political unity, not only 
of the cultural unity of the states in question. Now, France has one of the most open 
and liberal citizenship policies that allows with no restrictions multiple citizenship. 
However, we argue that the tension between this very liberal citizenship regime and 
the conceptualization of the French nationhood is likely to give rise to social tension 
and to affect the national cohesion of the French state. The ”crusading universalism 
of the French tradition” is in contradiction to the existence of multiple citizenship in 
fact. As individuals carry beside the French citizenship, another citizenship, this latter 
one is likely to carry, as well as the French one, a cultural dimension that may be at 
odds with the civic republicanism of the French state. The tension between multiple 
national membership and the cultural particularity of the nations has its roots in the 
French Revolution, whose ideology influenced the crystallization of nationhood in 
several European countries as a result of the French invasions, but also as a result 
of the 1848 European spring of peoples that mirrored the 1789 French Revolution. 
The strength of civic republicanism claimed by the French Revolution as the core of 
democracy contained the seeds of the period of unchained violence that followed, 
known as the Terror. The period of the Terror that coincided also with the crusading 
of the French troop in Europe were not expressions of an ethno-cultural nationalism 
but of a political-ideological one1. The centralization and integration in the state and 
nation took a violent turn and were followed by accesses of authoritarianism (first 
and second Empires of Napoleon I and Napoleon III), that ironically were presented 
as accomplishing the ideals of the Revolution, the creation of a nation of equal citizens, 
that is, a homogenous and well bounded demos. The French case illustrates very well 
the tension that exists between democracy and liberalism. Because of the political 
convulsions experienced by France in the 19th century, the French Revolution became 
what seemed to be a never-ending revolution, fact that led François Furet argue that 
the French Revolution ends after 1880. Not surprisingly it is in the 1880s that the 
”assimilationalist internal nationalism” formed the setting of the expansive reform of 
citizenship whose provisions constitute the backbone of the present day citizenship 
regime2. There are alternative explanations for the very liberal French citizenship law 
that emphasize the early democratization, the colonial experience and the partisan 
confrontation3, but Brubaker is best suited for our arguments. Thus, the expansion of 
citizenship did not follow the logic of demographic or military imperatives, but was 
rather the furthering of the political interest, convergent with the republican civic 
ideology which emphasized the nation in arms, that is universal and equal military 
service4. Second-generation immigrants were exempted from this duty, contrary to 
this national ideology of the French Revolution. For this reason emerged the need to 
expand citizenship to this category of prétendus étrangers5. 
1 Ibidem, p. 8.
2 Ibidem, p. 11.
3 See Marc Morjé HOWARD, The Politics of Citizenship in Europe, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 2009.
4 Rogers BRUBAKER, Citizenship and Nationhood...cit., p. 14.
5 Ibidem.
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Hence situations as that created by the wear of the burqa are emerging in 
Europe. The burqa is considered to be an antidemocratic and antinational element 
in France. Regarded as an instrument of oppression of women, – gender equality 
being an essential value of the French Republic –, the burqa has no religious relevance 
in the debate, but remains the symbol of traditional patriarchal societies that deny 
to women their rights and freedoms. Furthermore, the burqa is considered to be a 
threat to national security, as a person cannot be identified immediately in public and 
legitimated. In some respects, multiple citizenship and the case of the burqa, more 
particularly, illustrate that an extensive citizenry given by economic, demographic or 
military considerations, is likely to affect the legitimacy of the state and social cohesion 
if it does not follow the interest of the state as ”mediated by self-understandings, by 
cultural idioms, by ways of thinking and talking about nationhood”1.
Citizenship carries therefore a political and ideological burden as nationhood 
is often based on certain political principles. In the Netherlands for example, during 
the Batavian Republic, each citizen had to swear an oath condemning the previous 
regime on registration to vote2. A declaration of adherence to the new regime and the 
condemnation of federalism was also needed3. A recent case illustrates as well the 
ideological burden that citizenship can carry. Recently, a member of a German leftist 
party, the Die Linke, has been denied citizenship on the basis that the programmatic 
and ideological orientation of the party was incompatible with the liberal democratic 
principle of the Basic Law4. Even if Brubaker argues that the German nationhood was 
not originally political, this example illustrates how German citizenship acquired, 
after 1945, a more important political dimension, and how the nation became also a 
bearer of universal political values, as in France. In addition to this, the attack of the 
political values that underlie the German nation was conceived as an attack upon the 
German state, as the Die Linke party was supervised by the intelligence services.
Multiple Citizenship and Social Integration
 
Most authors agree that the automatic loss of birth citizenship upon naturalization 
acts as a deterrence for the emigrants’ naturalization. Thus, for most, it is seen as an 
obstacle to complete integration. I would argue that it is the opposite. The approval of 
dual citizenship is not only a setback in history to the doctrine of perpetual allegiance 
(that paradoxically was let go as to allow naturalisation in another country) but acts 
as an obstacle to integration, by allowing the emigrant to retain ”back up” options in 
keeping his birth citizenship (for example, he can buy properties in his birth country). 
By decreasing the costs of naturalization and by permitting the accumulation of 
citizenships, the states allow to the resident to maintain the ties with their countries 
of origin and to the culture of their birthplaces. As culture is a constituent element 
1 Ibidem, p. 16.
2 Maarten PRAK, ”Burghers into Citizens…cit.”, p. 413.
3 Ibidem.
4 Anuscheh FARAHAT, ”Germany: Denial of Naturalisation on Grounds of Ideological 
Orientation”, 10 March 2010, http://eudo-citizenship.eu/index.php?option=com_content&v
iew=article&id=257:germany-denial-of-naturalisation-on-grounds-of-ideological-orienta tion& 
ca tid=5:news&Itemid=7 (last consulted on 22.03.2010).
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of membership and identity, but also of the state, and democracy as we have seen, 
dual citizenship can entail symbolic conflict at the level of the political culture and 
of democracy. We will exemplify this conflict by reference to the case of the burqa 
of great actuality in Europe and by the case of the Rushdie affair. By allowing dual 
citizenship, states actually make emigrants understand that even after naturalization 
they can keep their traditions and their values, that naturalization does not require 
actually integration, political socialization and cognitive transformation, because by 
allowing multiple nationality states recognize the other national identity (the birth 
citizenship) that bears an important cultural burden, as legitimate. Thus multiple 
citizenship would encourage the claims for multiculturalism and for collective rights. 
This leads to a symbolic and cultural conflict that can weaken the democratic political 
culture and democracy itself. 
The wear of the burqa or the integral Islamic veil, is seen by the western countries 
as irreconcilable in conflict with some of their democratic principles, among which the 
equality and dignity of women. The burqa is considered to be a means of oppressing 
women, by the covering of their bodies and faces that contributes to a sexualisation 
of the female body. The wearing of the burqa is of course in strong opposition with 
the movement of liberation of women, part of the sexual revolution of the ’60s that 
saw the rise of postmaterialism and that had an important impact on the Western 
democracies. Not surprising, the change of gender roles and of the gender attitudes 
had an echo in politics, by the increase of women political participation, but also by 
the fact that gender equality was at some degree incorporated in the political culture of 
the western democracies. In terms of gender roles and attitudes, western democracies 
are opposed to the Islamic countries, characterized by strong patriarchalism1. Kenneth 
Lawson argues that: 
”If we think of the state as a social network with a multiplicity of nodes and 
competing understandings, it seems plausible that the boundaries are fluid in 
terms of defining what is a core national value, and what is marginal. Moreover, 
the official agents of the state are themselves likely to be dependent on these 
networks to generate and reproduce the social boundaries of nationalism”2. 
Competing understandings of the women’s role and of other issues as well, can 
therefore affect the cohesion of the nation. Emigration encourages the multiplicity 
of nodes within the national social network, as well as the chances for different 
understandings of what the boundaries of the legitimate are, or for what the values 
of the political culture are.
The ban of the burqa stirred debates in many European countries. Belgium forbade 
the wearing of the burqa in public places on reasons of public security, establishing the 
sanctioning with a fine between 15-25 Euros, but also the possibility of imprisonment 
1 See Pippa NORRIS, Ronald INGLEHART, ”Cultural Barriers to Women’s Leadership. 
A Worldwide Comparison”, Paper for Special Session 16 ”Social Cleavages and Elections”, 
3rd August 2000 at the International Political Science Association World Congress, Quebec City, 
p. 4 and Amal SABBAGH, ”The Arab States Enhancing Women’s Political Participation”, in 
Julie BALLINGTON, Azza KARAM (eds.), Women in Parliaments. Beyond Numbers, International 
IDEA, Stockholm, 2005, pp. 54-56.
2 Kenneth LAWSON, ”Belonging to the Nation and Not”, in Joel MIGDAL, Boundaries and 
Belonging, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004, p. 178.
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at the will of the local authorities. The bill was approved in April 2010 with the support 
of all five parties from the coalition government1.
The ban of the burqa has been a hot issue also in the Netherlands. The issue of the 
burqa ban was launched in the Netherlands by the Integration minister Rita Verdonk2, 
after the murder of Theo Van Gogh, which produced also a change of the citizenship 
law. The explanations of a Dutch MP, Geert Wilders, point out to the cultural and 
symbolic conflict behind its wearing: 
”We don’t want women to be ashamed to show who they are. Even if you 
have decided yourself to do that, you should not do it in Holland, because we 
want you to be integrated, assimilated into Dutch society. If people cannot see 
who you are, or see one inch of your body or your face, I believe this is not the 
way to integrate into our society”3. 
Now, the cultural clash with Islam has been more than evident in the Dutch society 
with the murder of the Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh, that enforced the connection 
between Islam and terrorism. By consequence, the burqa ban has been linked with the 
fight on terrorism: ”We have problems with a growing minority of Muslims who tend 
to have sympathy with the Islamo-fascistic concept of radical Islam”4. Unfortunately, 
we cannot say that there is no evidence to support this correlation. For example, in 
a small city of Belgium, Maaseik, that banned the niqab, five of the six women who 
wore it, renounced to it except one, who coincidence or not, is married to a suspect 
held in connection with the Madrid bombings5. However, till now, the decision of the 
government has been to ban the burqa only from government institutions and from 
schools6.
Denmark witnessed also a scandal, following the appearance of some caricatures 
of prophet Muhammad in the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten. What is interesting 
is that the ban of the burqa in public places has been proposed by the founder of 
the movement of Democrat Muslims, also MP, who argued that: ”The burqa is non-
Danish!”7. This is proof of the better integration of the Muslim emigrants, in the 
context in which the Danish citizenship law strictly forbids multiple citizenship. 
Not surprisingly, the measure is part of a package of measures meant to encourage 
integration of emigrants. However, the Danes did not declare the burqa illegal, but 
instead left to the institutions and enterprises the decision of its ban. The prime-mister 
Rasmussen announced draughty that the burqa represents a conception of women that 
1 ”Belgian Parliament Votes the Ban of the Islamic Veil”, Reuters, 29 April 2010, http://
www.reu ters.com/article/idUSTRE63S4LH20100429 (last consulted on 15.05.2010).
2 Anthony BROWNE, ”Dutch Unveil the Toughest Face in Europe with a Ban on the 
Burka”, 13th October 2005, The Times, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/
europe/article577915.ece (last consulted on 15.05.2010).
3 Mark MARDELL, ”Dutch MPs to Decide on Burqa Ban”, 16th January 2006, BBC News, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4616664.stm (last consulted on 15.05.2010).
4 Ibidem.
5 Ibidem.
6 ”The Netherlands: Government Said to Back Off Burqa Ban”, The New York Times, 
24th January 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/24/world/europe/24briefs-burqa.html 
(last consulted on 15.05.2010).
7 ”La burqa n’est pas Danoise”, Presseurop, 17 August 2009, http://www.presseurop.eu/
fr/content/news-brief-cover/77931-la-burqa-nest-pas-danoise (last consulted on 15.05.2010).
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is out of place in the Danish society1. The decision was taken at the recommendation 
of a commission from the Copenhagen University that produced a report on the burqa 
in Denmark.
In France, Nicolas Sarkozy decided at the end of April 2010 that the government 
may present a bill for the total ban of the burqa, despite the reluctance of the 
Council of State, after a meeting with the prime-minster, and with the leaders of the 
parliamentary groups, the main arguments for the ban being the dignity of women, 
and the respect of the national values2. One delicate issue is, in France, the fact that 
the majority of burqa wearers are French citizens who do not want to embrace the 
values of the French Republic, mainly the equality between men and women, and the 
secular spirit of the Republic. About 75% of the women who wear a burqa, are French 
citizens, while 25% are French women converted to Islam3. Now, as the majority 
of these women are dual citizens, as a consequence of the French citizenship law, 
the issue of the burqa entails a clash of cultures, and competing views about gender 
roles, about the condition of women and about democracy in the end. Their refusal 
is a symptom of social disintegration, and of the failure of the integrative powers of 
French civic republicanism, and undermines both the French nation and state, which 
are, at a certain degree, cultural products. This is because, historically, the French 
type of nationalism proved to be suspicious of pluralism, conceiving the ”people” 
as one and indivisible body. Paradoxically, the French political culture and French 
nationhood came into conflict with the allowance of dual citizenship, that is seen as a 
legitimation of cultural pluralism and of collective rights from the part of the French 
Salafist4 Muslims. In truth, the French state does not ask these women to relegate 
their birth citizenship with all its cultural implications. They are not obliged to make 
a choice between two Weltanschauung, to renounce to their cultural identity and to 
embrace a new one. Moreover, the question of the burqa stirred up also other delicate 
issues, after a women wearing the burqa behind the wheel was stopped by the police 
in Nantes. Following this incident and the women’s complaint, her husband has been 
accused of polygamy and his wives of illegally benefitting from social allocations for 
single parents, after the investigations of the police. Thus, the minister of the Interior 
said he would consider the withdrawal of his French citizenship and ordered further 
investigations5. This debate shows the salience of the cultural dimension of citizenship 
1 ”Le Danemark limite le port de la burqa”, Le Figaro, 28 January 2010, http://www.lefigaro.
fr/flash-actu/2010/01/28/01011-20100128FILWWW00666-le-danemark-limite-le-port-de-la-
burqa.php (last consulted on 15.05.2010).
2 Bruno JEUDY, ”Le port de la burqa sera totalement interdit en France”, Le Figaro, 
22 April 2010, http://www.lefigaro.fr/politique/2010/04/21/01002-20100421ARTFIG00252-
le-port-de-la-burqa-sera totalement-interdit-.php (last consulted on 30.05.2010).
3 Marie-Christine TABET, ”Deux mille femmes portent le voile intégral”, Le Journal de 
Dimanche, 13 December 2009, http://www.lejdd.fr/Societe/Religion/Actualite/Deux-mille-
femmes-portent-le-voile-integrale-157784/ (last consulted on 15.05.2010).
4 It seems that the women who wear the burqa are in great part the followers of Salafism, 
a radical movement of Islam, that gathers between 30 000 and 50 000 followers in France. See 
Cecilia GABIZON, ”Qui sont les femmes qui portent la burqa en France?”, Le Figaro, 19 June 
2009, http://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/2009/06/19/01016-20090619ARTFIG00011-femmes-
voilees-beaucoup-de-francaises-et-de-converties .php (last consulted on 15.05.2010).
5 ”Besson n’exclut pas une ’évolution législative’ sur la polygamie”, Le Monde, 26 April 
2010, http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2010/04/26/soupcon-de-polygamie-eric-besson-
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and of the state institutions. The defence of the cultural particularity and concreteness 
stems directly from the doctrine of self-determination and of popular sovereignty 
that emphasize the uniqueness and the idiosyncratic character of the people. The fact 
that the French envisage an amendment of the Civil Code so that it could permit the 
withdrawal of citizenship on the basis of fraud for the naturalized citizens, and that 
this measure could be applied only to multiple citizens (otherwise it would produce 
stateless persons, which is contrary to the international treaties on nationality) shows 
that the moral relevance of citizenship rests on relationships of reciprocity, underlined 
by a common culture. Birth is the primary proof of this common culture. 
The publication of Salman Rushdie’s book The Satanic Verses illustrates as well 
the incompatibility that can exist between several identities. The British Muslim 
community demanded the ban of the book in Great Britain. They claimed that the 
ban was a question of cultural survival and of the protection of a cultural identity. We 
must not forget that these individuals are multiple citizens, as the British nationality 
law is multiple citizenship-friendly. The Rushdie affair, as well as the burqa affair, 
point out to the limits of multiculturalism in a democracy and to the erosion of 
national citizenship. Now we must not forget that Salman Rushdie is himself a 
British citizen and is residing in the UK. Kymlicka’s theory of multiculturalism is 
problematic from the standpoint of the cases enumerated here because they illustrates 
the tension between internal restrictions and external protection1. Kymlicka explains 
that multiculturalism and external protection can foster internal restrictions in groups 
that limit individual rights and freedoms2. A similar case to that of the Rushdie affair 
is that of the Muhammad cartoons from the journal Jyllands-Posten, that stirred the 
anger of the Danish Muslims and of the Muslim community world-wide in 2005. The 
explanation given by the Danish editor is revealing for this ideological tension between 
Islam and democracy and for a situation when multiple identities (not necessarily 
national, as Denmark does not allow multiple citizenship) are conflicting: 
”The modern, secular society is rejected by some Muslims. They demand a 
special position, insisting on special consideration of their own religious feelings. 
It is incompatible with contemporary democracy and freedom of expression, 
where you must be ready to put up with insults, mockery and ridicule”3. 
The violent reaction of the Muslim community is in fact an expression of a lack 
of integration and of the rejection of the democratic values of the Danish society, as 
Flemming Rose argues: 
”We have a tradition of satire when dealing with the royal family and other 
public figures, and that was reflected in the cartoons. The cartoonists treated 
Islam the same way they treat Christianity, Buddhism, Hinduism and other 
religions. And by treating Muslims in Denmark as equals they made a point: 
We are integrating you into the Danish tradition of satire because you are part 
rappe lle- que-la-pro cedure-de-decheance-prendra-du-temps_1342468_3224.html (last consulted 
on 30.05.2010).
1 Will KYMLICKA, Multicultural Citizenship...cit., pp. 35-45.
2 Ibidem, p. 43.
3 Flemming ROSE, ”Muhammed’s ansigt”, Jyllands-Posten, 29 September 2005, http://
jp.dk/indland/article216582.ece (last consulted on 15.05.2010).
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of our society, not strangers. The cartoons are including, rather than excluding 
Muslims”1. 
The capacity of democratic countries to integrate immigrants is limited by the 
need to protect their own democratic culture and their own national values that are 
shaken by the erosion of national citizenship. As Islam takes the form of a gnosis, just 
as the Communist parties did, and as transnational networks multiply, the democratic 
principles on which the western nation-states are founded are also endangered 
because with the decrease of the costs of naturalization, national citizenship is 
devaluated and the sense of belonging diminishes, facts that undermine the national 
cohesion necessary for the functioning of these states. Another important argument 
for these cases is that the secularity of the state goes hand in hand with the birth of 
the nation-state; thus the erosion of nationality can cause an erosion of the secularism. 
Pierre Manent argues that the secular state could not survive the disappearance of the 
nation-state2. The secularity of the state rests on its transcendence that is embodied 
by the nation3. 
After all these examples we can inquire on the opportunity of collective rights 
and of multiculturalism. We consider that multiple citizenship encourages the claim 
for collective rights and for multicultural policies, because, by permitting multiple 
allegiances, the states actually legitimate other national identities, with all their 
political and cultural content. Moreover, the case of Islam is different from that of 
other religions. Although we are talking about religious identity, Islam is a law 
religion (Sharia). The demarcation line between the national and the religious elements 
that are comprised in the citizenship is quite vague in the case of the Muslim states. 
Furthermore, one must not forget that these religious minorities are not historical 
minorities, but they are the result of voluntary emigration and form what Kymlicka 
calls polyethnic groups. He stresses the fact that polyethnic groups do not have the 
right to collective rights, although as we have seen in examples above, there are 
already claims of such rights. Kymlicka considers that by emigration the individual is 
deciding to uproot himself voluntarily from his birth country and to relinquish some 
of the rights that come with its prior citizenship4, relinquishing one social contract 
and entering another. Though, multiple citizenship trumps this logic and the promise 
of integration; after all, by retaining political rights the dual citizens participate to the 
expression of the popular sovereignty of their birth nation. Kymlicka emphasizes the 
fact that the polyethnic or collective rights are legitimate as long as they ”are limited 
by the principles of individual liberty, democracy and social justice”5. Both British 
and Danish Criminal Codes prohibit blasphemy. Nevertheless, freedom of speech is 
a deeply rooted value in these countries. Denmark for example was the first state 
to declare freedom of the press in 17706. It is quite clear that a part of the citizens, of 
Muslim religion feel humiliated and insulted in these two cases, and claim that their 
1 IDEM, ”Why I Published Those Cartoons”, Washington Post, 19 February 2006, http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/02/17/AR2006021702499.html 
(last consulted on 15.05.2010).
2 Pierre MANENT, Raţiunea naţiunilor, cit., p. 87.
3 Ibidem.
4 Will KYMLICKA, Multicultural Citizenship...cit., p. 96.
5 Ibidem, p. 6.
6 John Christian LAURSEN, ”David Hume...cit.”, p. 168.
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religious precepts should be above the national democratic ones. For the Western 
democratic states this claim is problematic, as they want to assure the survival of their 
national culture and of their institutions. Unfortunately, different groups have different 
understandings of individual autonomy and freedom. The acceptance of multiple 
citizenship legitimates the existence of opposing views about individual freedom and 
about the limits of democracy and encourages ideological and cultural conflict inside 
society. Interesting in Kymlicka’s theory is also his definition of citizenship. For him 
national citizenship rests on the same principles as group-differentiated rights; it is in 
itself a group-differentiated notion1. Now, multiple citizenship is contrary to this logic 
because citizenship, not being an exclusive category anymore, is not ”differentiating” 
anymore either. This is unfortunate, as the legitimacy of democracies and states rests 
on the difference of a people, and on its will to further this difference by political 
representation. 
The Securitization of Multiple Citizenship
The securitization of citizenship is convergent with the critique of open borders on 
the ground that outsiders may threaten the values of liberal democracy. Securitization 
goes hand in hand with the rejection of dual citizenship that undermines the loyalty 
to the state and co-citizens and therefore security. The need to preserve national 
security and public order entitles the states to restrict the entry of people, even in 
the eyes of the most fierce liberal egalitarians2. As by controlling the immigration, 
the states control at some point also the composition of the population that could 
have access to naturalization, immigration and citizenship policies are interrelated 
and both are influenced by the security dilemma. Not surprisingly, dual citizens have 
been regarded with suspicion by national authorities following situations of breaches 
in the national security. One such example is that of the Japanese-Americans that 
were put into camps during the last stages of WWII. 9/11 constitutes another such 
moment that provoked the securitization of citizenship. Examples of securitization of 
citizenship can be found in Western Europe, as well as in Eastern Europe, and in Asia, 
as we will further see.
The securitization of citizenship is caused by an overall securitization of 
immigration. Several factors contributed to this situation. One is the association of 
asylum seekers with national security. We must not forget that the institution of asylum 
for foreigners represents a great attack on the unlimited sovereignty of the states and 
on their invincible boundaries3. The securitization of citizenship that followed the 
9/11 attack, the London bombing of 2005, and the 2004 Madrid train bombing, is 
reflected in the citizenship legislation by the fact that several countries restricted their 
citizenship laws. One modification was made to permit the withdrawal of citizenship 
to naturalized citizen following fraud or misrepresentation. However, the UK 
amended in 2002 the British Nationality Act as to allow the revocation of citizenship of 
both naturalized and birthright citizens for bringing prejudice to the national interest, 
1 Will KYMLICKA, Multicultural Citizenship...cit., p. 124.
2 Joseph CARENS, ”Aliens and Citizens...cit.”, p. 238.
3 Audrey MACKLIN, ”The Securitisation of Dual Citizenship”, in Thomas FAIST, Peter 
KIVISTO (eds.), Dual Citizenship...cit., p. 43.
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which is unprecedented since WWII1. Moreover, the United Kingdom, Australia and 
Ireland that once had unrestricted jus soli, restricted it to the children born of parents 
with a lawful resident status2. These amendments were directly linked to the national 
security threat brought by apparent law-abiding citizens. From the four attackers of 
the London underground, three were dual British Pakistani citizens and one was a 
British-Jamaican dual citizen. Now, although the 1951 Pakistani citizenship law does 
not allow dual citizenship, following dual citizenship agreements with some countries, 
among which the UK, the Pakistani government recognizes dual citizenship upon 
naturalization in the countries part of the agreements3. The Jamaican authorities also 
accept dual citizenship, despite an ambiguous provision in the constitution concerning 
dual citizenship4. What was even more intriguing to the British authorities, is that they 
were British citizens by birth, that is, second-generation citizens of immigrants5. The 
fact that they were all dual citizens, and that they were willing to become a security 
threat to their own nation is revealing for the fact that trust cannot be separated from 
citizenship as a bundle of rights and duties, and that multiple nationality constitutes 
often conflicting identities. In 2006, the conditions for citizenship revocation were 
thinned to the main condition of conducing to public good6. 
Some countries like the Netherlands and Denmark restricted even more the 
citizenship laws following some acts of violence of immigrants. The Netherlands 
sought to modify the citizenship law as to restrict even more the situations of dual 
citizenship, following the murder of film director Theo van Gogh. Van Gogh was 
murdered in 2004, in the street, by a Dutch-Moroccan citizen. His murder came after 
another one, that of politician Pim Fortuyn, in 2002. Following this event, the Minister 
of Alien Affairs and Integration submitted a bill trying to eliminate the exceptions 
for dual citizens in the case of second generation immigrants and foreign spouses7. 
Another proposal concerned the revocation of citizenship to dual citizens convicted of 
terroristic acts8. Since then the Dutch Integration minister tried to convince Moroccan 
authorities to recognise the voluntary renunciation to birth citizenship since 227 692 
people hold both Dutch and Moroccan citizenship9. Overall the number of dual citizens 
1 Ibidem, p. 60.
2 Ibidem, p. 50.
3 ”India/Pakistan: Information on whether a person born in Kashmir of Indian (Kashmiri) 
parents is considered to be Indian or Pakistani, whether Pakistani citizenship is acquired by 
birth in Kashmir, and whether India and Pakistan recognize dual citizenship with each other”, 
Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, 1 August 1994, ZZZ18171.E, available at: http://www.
unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6ac465c.html (last consulted on 20.05.2010).
4 ”Jamaica/St. Vincent: Whether a Jamaican citizen born in Jamaica who lived for five 
years in St. Vincent and obtained St. Vincent citizenship can have dual citizenship (Jamaica and 
St. Vincent)”, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, 29 October 2001, ZZZ38058.E, available 
at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3df4bed720.html (last consulted on 20.05.2010).
5 Audrey MACKLIN, ”The Securitisation...cit.”, p. 60.
6 Ibidem, p. 61.
7 Ricky van ŒRS, Betty de HART, Kees GROENENDIJK, ”The Netherlands”, in Rainer 
BAUBOCK, Eva ERSBØLL, Kees GROENENDIJK, Harald WALDRAUCH (eds.), Acquisition 
and Loss of Nationality...cit., p. 408.
8 Ibidem, p. 409.
9 Sarah TOUAHRI, ”Morocco Decries Move by Netherlands to Eradicate Dual Nationality”, 
9 August 2009, Maghrebia, http://www.magharebia.com/cocoon/awi/xhtml1/en_GB/
features/awi/features/2008/07/09/feature-01 (last consulted on 15.05.2010).
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tripled from 1995, reaching 1.1 million people in 20091. Moreover, very recently, at the 
middle of June 2010, the Dutch Nationality Act has been amended in order to restrict 
multiple citizenship by removing the exceptions for the renunciation of the previous 
citizenship upon naturalization for people raised in the Netherlands, and for allowing 
the withdrawal of the citizenship following crimes that bring prejudice to the interests 
of the state, as in the case of terroristic activity2.
In Eastern Europe, the securitization of dual citizenship can be seen in the debate 
on the status laws. Status laws result from the triadic nexus defined by Rogers Brubaker, 
between national minorities, nationalizing states and external national homelands3. 
Each kin state tries by these laws to protect its external minorities conceiving the 
boundaries of its nation outside of state boundaries. After the fall of communism, 
several states like Romania and Hungary sought to support the kin minorities, like 
part of a nation-building process, as testified by the constitutions of post-19894. Thus, 
for Zoltan Kantor, status laws are a syndrome of post-communist nation-building5. 
The debate on the adoption of Status Law for the external Hungarian minorities – 
creating certain advantages, but not proper citizenship for these communities – started 
in 2001. The 2001 Status Law adopted by the Orbán government provided some 
form of state membership that would supply social benefits to ethnic Hungarians 
abroad, in the form of a Hungarian Identity Card6. The benefiters of the law could 
be provided with free work permits and loose conditions of entry as well as support 
for education in Hungary. Such laws that provide support to external minorities are 
quite common, as Austria, Italy, Slovenia, Slovakia, Greece, Russia, Bulgaria all have 
endorsed such provisions7. After that, the debate concentrated in extending full non-
resident citizenship to external transborder minorities, which entailed of course the 
creation of a situation of dual citizenship for 3 million people8, although the 2001 law 
was made especially for avoiding situations of dual citizenship. A referendum held in 
2004 on the grant of dual citizenship failed because of the low turnout. Finally, in 2010, 
the bill on dual citizenship passed the parliamentary vote, granting citizenship upon 
1 Han NICOLAAS, ”New Statistical Data on Dual Citizens in the Netherlands”, European 
Union Democracy Observatory on Citizenship, 15 December 2009, http://eudo-citizenship.eu/
citizenship-news/197-new-statistical-data-on-dual-citizens-in-the-netherlands (last consulted 
on 15.05.2010).
2 Gerard-René de GROOT, Maarten VINK, ”Netherlands: Revision of the Nationality Act”, 
European Union Democracy Observatory on Citizenship, 12 July 2010, http://eudo-citizenship.eu/
citizenship-news/348-revision-of-the-netherlands-nationality-act- (last consulted on 15.07.2010).
3 Rogers BRUBAKER, Nationalism Reframed, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
1996, pp. 60-69.
4 Zoltan KANTOR, ”The Concept of Nation in Central and East European Status Laws”, in 
Osamu IEDA (ed.) ”Beyond Sovereignty: From Status Law to Transnational Citizenship”, Slavic 
Eurasian Studies, no. 9, 2006, p. 40.
5 Ibidem, p. 50.
6 Maria KOVACS, ”The Politics of Dual Citizenship in Hungary”, in Thomas FAIST, Peter 
KIVISTO (eds.), Dual Citizenship…cit., p. 96.
7 Attila VARGA, ”Legislative Aspects and Political Excuses: Hungarian-Romanian 
Disagree ments on the Act on Hungarians Living in Neighboring Countries”, in ”The Hungarian 
Status Law: Nation Building and/or Minority Protection”, Slavic Eurasian Studies, no. 4, 2004, 
p. 462.
8 Maria KOVACS, ”The Politics...cit.”, p. 93.
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application to non-resident descendants of former Hungarians citizens, speaking 
Hungarian, in the neighbouring countries, but not to the diasporic communities, 
detail that suggests a configuration of the nation on ethnic-territorial basis, and not 
on ethnic-cultural one, that could be seen also in the 2001 Status Law1. The new bill on 
dual citizenship for the external minorities proposed and voted in may 2010 does not 
contain explicitly the promise of political rights, that are the most problematic ones, 
as they are seen as a rejection of the Trianon treaty and thus endanger the sovereignty 
of the neighbouring states. After the First World War, the Trianon Treaty obliged the 
Hungarians left outside the state borders to opt for the home state’s citizenship or to 
move to Hungary. Therefore, all change of citizenship for the external minorities can 
be seen as a violation of the treaty and as a revisionist attack on the state borders2. In 
order for the external minorities to receive voting rights, the Hungarian electoral law 
must be modified to remove the residence requirement3. This is likely to happen as 
some parties, and especially the extreme right ones, want to attract the support of the 
external voter communities. Voting rights are the most problematic because they run 
against the popular sovereignty and self-determination doctrine, not to mention the 
fact that a such large mass of new voters could destabilize the political configuration 
and support extremist parties. The result of the elections could be decided thus 
by a large mass of individuals who do not pay taxes and who are not subjects of 
the Hungarian law4. Such a dilemma is extremely relevant also in the Romanian-
Moldovan case. Moreover, some authors claim that dual citizenship is incompatible 
with claims for autonomy5. In support of the strong symbolic dimension of dual 
citizenship that is often neglected, the law will be published on 20 August this year, 
the anniversary of the Hungarian statehood. A very hostile reaction from the Slovak 
politicians triggered a modification of the Slovak Citizenship Act, as to provide the 
loss of Slovak citizenship upon the acquirement of another citizenship voluntarily6.
The situation of the Baltic states is very similar to that of some Asian states in 
what concerns the citizenship policy for minorities. Therefore, after the exit from 
foreign domination, the majorities sought to remedy the historical injustices. The 
legacy of past foreign domination is best illustrated by discriminatory citizenship 
policies towards ethnic minorities, throughout the two regions. This phenomenon 
can be seen in the Baltic States, as well as in the Asian states, like Burma, Thailand, 
1 Iván HALÁSZ, ”Models of Kin Minority Protection in Central and Eastern Europe”, in 
Osamu IEDA (ed.), ”Beyond Sovereignty....cit.”, Slavic Eurasian Studies, no. 9, 2006, p. 266.
2 Maria KOVACS, ”The Politics...cit.”, pp. 99-100.
3 Maria KOVACS, Szabolcs POGONYI, ”Ethnic Hungarians in Transborder States May 
Well Be the Biggest Losers and Victims of Hungary’s Dual Citizenship Reforms”, 25 May 
2010, European Union Democracy Observatory on Citizenship, http://eudo-citizenship.eu/
citizenship-news/310-the-political-context-of-the-hungarian-proposal-qethnic-hungarians-in-
transborder-states-may-well-be-the-biggest-losers-and-victims-of-hungarys-dual-citizenship-
reformsq (last consulted on 25.05.2010).
4 Janos KIS, ”Miért megyek el szavazni?”, Nepszabadsag, 20 November 2004, quoted in 
Maria KOVACS, ”The Politics...cit.”, p. 101.
5 See Rainer BAUBÖCK, ”The Trade-Off Between Transnational Citizenship and Political 
Autonomy”, in Thomas FAIST, Peter KIVISTO (eds.), Dual Citizenship…cit., pp. 69-91.
6 Dagmar KUSA, ”Slovak Parliament Reacts to Hungarian Citizenship Reform with 
Restrictions on Dual Citizenship”, European Union Democracy Observatory on Citizenship, 27 May 
2010, http://eudo-citizenship.eu/citizenship-news/306-hungarian-government-proposes-access-
to-citizenship-for-ethnic-hungarians-in-neighbouring-countries (last consulted on 27.05.2010).
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and Sri Lanka. The majorities tried to reassert pre-colonial and pre-communist 
hierarchies in both regions with the use of citizenship policies that were also part of 
a wider nationalizing process. During the communist regime, the Russian minority 
enjoyed higher salaries, better accommodation and leading positions in Estonia 
and Latvia. After the independence, the ethnic majorities wanted retribution and 
imposed the Estonian and Latvian language as criteria for obtaining positions in the 
administration. In Estonia and Latvia the Russians were stripped of their citizenship 
and have to demand it again and pass a language test. In Estonia, the citizenship 
law of 1992 recognized as citizens only those individuals who were citizens of the 
Republic of Estonia as of the date of occupation of Estonia by the USSR, on 16 June 
1940 or are descendants of these individuals1. Ever since, the citizenship law has been 
liberalized as to allow naturalization. Citizens and non-citizens have the same rights 
of participation in the social and political sphere with the only exception of party 
membership2. A similar situation can be seen in Southern Asia. In 1949, the Indian 
Tamils (the Indian Tamils brought by the British as workers on the plantations) were 
stripped of their citizenship as a retribution measure. The case of Sri Lanka is very 
similar to that of the Baltic states. In the case of the Baltic states, the USSR colonized 
Russians, which enjoyed privileges to better control the region. In Sri Lanka, the 
British brought Indians to work on the plantations, in the 19th century. Now, those 
Indians bear the name of Indian Tamils or Upcountry Tamils. After independence 
they were stripped of citizenship just like the Russians. On the same model, ethnic 
Chinese were stripped of citizenship in Indonesia and Malaysia after independence3. 
We must stress that the Chinese emigrants always had an advantaged economic status 
in these countries during the colonial times, for the fact that they were traders. In the 
Baltic States as well as in the Asian states the citizenship laws have been liberalized, 
when the authorities of both regions realized that these ethnic minorities will not 
return to China or Russia. In Thailand, the hill tribes, that is the people residing in 
the border zone between China, Burma, Laos and Thailand (the hill tribes consist of 
several distinct ethnic groups: the Akha, the Lahu, the Karen, the Hmong, the Mien 
and the Lisu and can be considered a transnational minority), were also denied Thai 
citizenship, together with freedom of movement and social rights. As much as 40-60% 
of hill tribe people remain without citizenship4. The marginalization of the hill tribes 
was seen as a solution to prevent the extension of Chinese communism. Moreover, 
the hill tribe people were regarded as illegal migrants not being able to prove their 
long-time residence in Thailand5. However, in 2001 the legislation was liberalized in 
response to international pressures. The countries enumerated above do not allow 
dual citizenship. This is so because that the states perceive their national minorities, 
that would be the first to benefit from a potential liberalization of dual citizenship, 
as a potential fifth column, as a collaborator of a hostile neighbour that can threaten 
1 Leif KALEV, Rein RUUTSOO, ”The Shadow of the Past and the Promise of the EU”, in 
Devorah KALEKIN-FISHMAN, Pirkko PITKANEN, Multiple Citizenship...cit., p. 219.
2 Ibidem, p. 231.
3 Will KYMLICKA, ”Liberal Multiculturalism: Western Models, Global Trends and Asian 
Debates”, in Will KYMLICKA, Baogang HE (eds.), Multiculturalism in Asia, Oxford University 
Press, New York, 2005, p. 52.
4 Mika TOYOTA, ”Subject of the Nation Without Citizenship: The Case of Hill Tribes in 
Thailand”, in Will KYMLICKA, Baogang HE (eds.), Multiculturalism in Asia, cit., p. 111.
5 Ibidem, p. 119.
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their security. The loyalty of ethnic minorities towards the state is questioned when 
demands for rights are backed by a neighbouring kin state, including citizenship 
rights. This can be seen in several cases in Asia: India regarding Kashmir, Sri Lanka 
regarding the Tamils, Thailand regarding the Malays, but also the Baltic states 
regarding their Russian minorities, Slovakia regarding the Hungarians, Romania 
regarding the Hungarians. The same can be said about the Turks in Bulgaria.
Following the cases mentioned above, and especially in what concerns the link 
between dual citizenship and terrorism, one can rightfully ask himself if not this dual 
allegiance promotes rather social disintegration, than integration and cohesion. Dual 
citizens are seen as a threat as they can use forms of protest and their civic rights in 
order to obtain some collective rights that could clash with the democratic values 
of the society. In the case of the Status Law, and especially in the case of the laws 
that establish dual citizenship for external minorities, the main problem resides in the 
extraterritorial effects of these laws, but most of all in that they are contrary to self-
determination and to popular sovereignty. Moreover, these laws, by establishing dual 
citizenship, entail discrimination and inequality between the citizens, no matter their 
ethnicity. The right to dual citizenship cannot be formulated in terms of collective 
rights, even in the context of non-neutrality of the states.
The Legal Dimension of Multiple Citizenship
The legislation on citizenship is situated from the juridical standpoint, at the 
border between public law and private law, and at the border between international 
and domestic law1. The relationship between nationality and citizenship is becoming 
more and more problematic with the rise of multiple citizenship, and some, hastily 
pronounce the schism between the two categories. However, in the legal treaties on 
citizenship, this link is not at all problematic in the 19th century. As André Weiss notes 
in his treaty of international law, the criteria for nationality does not count so much 
as, in legal terms the definition of the nation has been established by the practice and 
the legal tradition: 
”La nation est un être moral, susceptible d’avoir, dans ses rapports, avec 
les êtres similaires qui l’entourent, des droits et des obligations, dont le droit 
international a précisément pour objet de fixer la nature et l’étendue”2. 
There is no tension between nationality and citizenship, as in the postnationalists’ 
view, because ”every citizen is a national, but every national is not a citizen” (”tout 
citoyen est national, mais tout national n’est pas citoyen”3). Moreover, citizenship 
has a contractual dimension. This contract, linking the state and the citizen, is based 
1 Patrick WEIL ”L’accès à la citoyenneté: une comparaison de vingt-cinq lois sur la 
nationalité”, Travaux du centre d’études et de prévision du Ministère de l’Intérieur, Nationalité 
et Citoyenneté, nouvelle donnée d’un espace européen, no. 5, May 2002, available online http://www.
patrick-weil.com/Fichiers%20du%20site/2002%20-%20L’accès%20à%20la%20citoyenneté.pdf, 
p. 2 (last consulted on 19.05.2010).
2 André WEISS, Traité théorique et pratique de droit international privé. De la nationalité, vol. I, 
Librairie du Recueil Général des Lois et des Arrêts et du Journal du Palais, Paris, 1892, p. 5.
3 Ibidem, p. 7.
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on consent and is synallagmatic or mutually-binding. The contract cannot survive 
without the will of one of the parts. The existence of multiple citizenship challenges 
this argument stating that immigration or naturalization do not in fact represent 
a withdrawal of the consent that underlies the contract with the birth state. This 
postnationalist argument that supports multiple national identities is not as new, as 
shown by Weiss’s critique of what is the doctrine of perpetual allegiance, that he attributes 
to feudalism1. This doctrine, that could permit multiple national allegiances, is in fact 
the product of feudal relations and of seigniorial law that linked the vassal to the 
suzerain for life, having thus in fact very undemocratic roots, despite the democratic 
aura created by the postnationalists. The renunciation to the doctrine of perpetual 
allegiance, was in fact celebrated as a democratic change, rooted in the Renanian 
conception of the subjective voluntarist nation. The United States renounced to it in 
1868, Great Britain in 1870, and Switzerland in 18762, at that time allowing multiple 
citizenship being unimaginable. As expatriation entails that an individual voluntarily 
subjects itself to another national legislation and order, one cannot doubt that this 
is not a ”slap on the face” of his homeland, or that his will is not unequivocally 
expressed, as Weiss puts it3. He can no longer hold his duties to his birth state upon 
naturalization and to his fellow co-nationals (there are, for example, bilateral treaties 
which establish that dual nationals do not pay taxes in both states). Citizens who 
leave their country and are naturalized in another do this because they feel their 
homeland cannot provide for them, that is, it cannot hold the promises from the 
national contract. However, despite the acquisition of another citizenship, they do not 
want to relinquish the rights that were part of contract, triggering a sort of free riding 
attitude from the migrants’ part. Multiple citizenship facilitates what Peter Spiro calls 
the ”citizenship of convenience”4. If birth citizenship and naturalisation upon loss 
of citizenship would reflect the prioritisation of citizenship and identity, multiple 
citizenship no longer constitutes the prioritisation of citizenship, diluting substantial 
ties subsumed by citizenship5, as one membership is necessarily subordinated to 
another. This undermines of course the very nature of citizenship, as absolute, total 
membership. Thus ”second-, third- or even fourth-choice citizenship”6 represents 
a dissolution of the political community, of the state and also of democracy, as the 
level of integration necessary to democratic politics is no longer fulfilled. In this 
respect, multiple citizenship decouples citizenship from the actual membership to the 
community7. According to Peter Schuck, either the first citizenship is likely to be the 
primary one, as it stems from acculturation in a society, while the second membership 
is more opportunistic, and in this sense less legitimate, either the second one is the 
genuine one being born of a personal will8. Either way multiple citizenship constitutes 
a hierarchy of national membership which goes against the essence of citizenship as 
a total type of membership. 
1 Ibidem, p. 13.
2 Ibidem, pp. 16-18.
3 Ibidem, p. 15.
4 Peter SPIRO, ”Dual Citizenship...cit.”, p. 195.
5 Ibidem.
6 Ibidem, p. 196.
7 Ibidem, p. 195.
8 Peter H. SCHUCK, Citizens, Strangers…cit., p. 228.
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In the 19th century law treaties one can find also arguments against the situation 
of dual citizenship, regarded as anomalous. One argument is that the nationality 
cannot be shared in the sense that it is exclusive and absolute: 
”elle réclame du citoyen toute son activité, tout son dévouement; elle absorbe 
sa personnalité toute entière. Aussi bien les droits et les obligations que la 
nationalité engendre sont-ils le plus souvent exclusifs et font-ils obstacle à ce que 
le même individu puisse se dire à la fois citoyen de deux États”1. 
The arguments against multiple nationality touched upon military duties that 
cannot be satisfied and may be conflicting in time of war, but also upon the exercise of 
political rights2. In the 19th century France prohibited dual citizenship. To a demand for 
naturalization of lord Brougham in 1848, Adolphe Crémieux, the minister of Justice of 
the Republic, answered that a situation of dual citizenship is unacceptable for France 
because it contradicts the principle of equality between citizens3. 
Nowadays, with the spreading of multiple citizenship we face a return to the 
doctrine of perpetual allegiance. Even the states who do not allow to their naturalized 
citizens to retain their birth citizenship, allow however to their natives to retain the 
national citizenship when acquiring another citizenship, for example when marrying 
a foreigner (Denmark). International law treaties have always forbidden multiple 
citizenship, but we can observe a trend towards the liberalization of multiple citizenship 
in the last 50 years. This trend is likely to affect the sovereignty of the state, and to create 
overlapping spaces of state authority and of law, since the government is exercised on 
a particular territory, that is on the individuals residing on a specific territory that are 
subjects of law. States continue to exercise a personal sovereignty over their emigrants4. 
Thus, according to the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, a 
state requires not only a territory, but also a permanent population5. The first efforts 
to reduce cases of multiple citizenship were made through bilateral agreements, like 
the Bancroft Treaties and later through international treaties under the patronage of 
the League of Nations such as the 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating 
to the Conflict of Nationality Laws6. After 1945, there is a decoupling of citizenship and 
military service with the adoption of professional armies, that was accelerated by the 
emergence of postmaterialism, and of pacifist movement in the ’60s. As the decline of 
conscription was one of the main arguments against dual citizenship, states started to 
tolerate more multiple forms of allegiance. Little by little, states denounced also the 
provisions of the Strasbourg Convention on the Reduction of Cases of Multiple Nationality 
and Military Obligations in Cases of Multiple Nationality signed in 1963, and the cases 
of multiple citizenship mushroomed since the 1970s7. What is more, in the 1970s, the 
high legal courts in France and Germany recognised the right of the foreigners to 
permanent residence, against the tentative of the governments to force the immigrants 
1 Andre WEISS, Traité théorique...cit., pp. 23-24.
2 Ibidem.
3 Ibidem, p. 27.
4 Christian JOPPKE, ”Citizenship between…cit.”.
5 Maarten VINK, Gerard René de GROOT, ”Citizenship Attribution…cit.”, p. 4.
6 Triadafilos TRIADAFILOPOULOS, ”Dual Citizenship and Security Norms in Historical 
Perspective”, in Thomas FAIST, Peter KIVISTO (eds.), Dual Citizenship...cit., p. 32.
7 Maarten VINK, Gerard René de GROOT, ”Citizenship Attribution…cit.”, pp. 16-17.
523
Romanian Political Science Review • vol. X • no. 3 • 2010
Multiple Citizenship, Nation and Democracy
out of the country, and to deny them residence permits1. By consequence the 1993 
Second Protocol Amending the Convention on the Reduction of cases of nationality and 
Military Obligations in cases of Multiple Nationality and the 1997 European Convention on 
Nationality no longer reject multiple citizenship but is seen as a means of encouraging 
naturalization and integration2. Thus, by 2009 only three countries demanded 
renunciation of previous citizenship upon naturalization: Austria, Denmark, Norway 
while the Netherlands has some exceptions3. Six countries still have some provisions 
concerning the loss of citizenship dues to voluntary naturalization in another country 
but there are numerous exceptions: Austria, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, 
Norway and Spain4. In other words citizenship has been instrumentalised as a crucial 
part of integration policies, and as a consequence of the increasing acceptance of 
immigration5. However, this development caused a thinning of national citizenship, 
despite the fact that it was meant to enforce the identity dimension of citizenship, 
because this liberalization went hand in hand with the acceptance of multiple 
citizenship. The changes of the jus sanguinis that occurred in the 1980s encouraged the 
emergence of multiple citizenship situations as equal treatment of men and women 
brought also the right of women to pass on their citizenship to their children (jus 
sanguinis a patre et a matre). Women could also keep their citizenship after marrying a 
foreigner against the unitary system of nationality within a family6. Moreover, several 
states introduced provisions for the recovery of citizenship for the descendants of 
emigrants, which also led to situations of multiple citizenship. Germany and the 
Netherlands reintroduced however a provision for loss of citizenship in case of foreign 
military service, after Dutch and German dual citizens fought in Kosovo7. Now, this 
liberalisation and increased acceptance of multiple nationality, is also rooted in a new 
conception on citizenship that is endorsed by the postnationalists: citizenship as a 
human right, as it results from article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
the problem being that the article does not specify to which nationality the person 
is entitled8. This represents a shift from the classical conception of citizenship that 
conceived it as a status of abstract character to which rights and duties are attached9. 
Thus against the postnationalist view of citizenship that decouples nationality from 
rights, Joppke reminds us that: 
”State membership is conceptually at a different level from the right to life 
or liberty, because the rights that are contingently tied to state membership (e.g., 
the right to diplomatic protection) could also be granted in some other way”10. 
1 Patrick WEIL, ”L’accès à la citoyenneté…cit.“, p. 16.
2 Ibidem, p. 35.
3 Maarten VINK, Gerard René de GROOT, ”Citizenship Attribution…cit.”, p. 14.
4 Ibidem, p. 15.
5 Ibidem, p. 5.
6 Gerard René de GROOT, ”The Background of the Changed attitude of Western European 
States...cit.”, p. 100.
7 Maarten VINK, Gerard René de GROOT, ”Citizenship Attribution…cit.”, p. 16.
8 Gerard René de GROOT, ”Nationality Law”, in Jan SMITS (ed.), The Elgar Encyclopaedia 
of Comparative Law, Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, 2006, p. 483.
9 Christian JOPPKE, ”Citizenship between...cit.”, p. 5.
10 Ibidem
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Citizenship is not a right per se, but a source of rights. These new trends in 
citizenship policy have been conceptualized by Christian Joppke in terms of re-
ethnicization and de-ethnicization1. Both processes are caused by international migration. 
Multiple citizenship has been a result of the de-ethnicization of citizenship, as well 
as of the re-ethnicization of citizenship. Most states changed their citizenship laws 
in both ways simultaneously, while some sought to privilege emigrant, rather than 
immigrant dual citizenship (Germany) or the other way around (Belgium)2. 
By decreasing the costs of the naturalization itself, dual citizenship devaluates in 
fact the national citizenship of the states and so does also the turning of citizenship into 
a human right. As once, the rights that stem from citizenship were ”positive rights, 
conceded through the blood of war, the sweat of work and the tears of reproduction”3, 
the proliferation of multiple citizenship in present days hollows out the national 
citizenship and ”marks the secular decline of the citizenship construct”4. 
Multiple Citizenship, Boundaries 
and Democratic Theory
The relationship between boundaries and democracy in the context of extensive 
transmigration has been a central point in the domain of boundary ethics. Although 
the studies do not touch precisely the issue of dual citizenship, boundary ethics 
is essential to the study of multiple citizenship because it contests the boundaries 
at highest level. Multiple citizenship is per se a dissolution of boundaries, because 
boundaries presuppose exclusivity; while the boundaries’ action is particularizing, 
the multiple citizenship’s action is uniformizing. In a way, the effect of the multiple 
citizenship is the same with that of a cosmopolitan universal citizenship. If a 
cosmopolitan universal citizenship cannot be established, the boundaries of national 
membership can be blurred by the multiplication of citizenship. However, recently, 
there have been attacks from the postnationalist camp, that is also strongly anti-statist, 
on the boundedness of the sovereign demos, which is considered to be undemocratic. 
One such critique is that brought by Arash Abizadeh that claims the existence of an 
irreconcilable opposition between liberalism and democracy5, a claim that is present 
also in Carl Schmitt’s critique of democracy. The literature of boundary ethics is split 
between the advocates of open borders and its contesters. We will present some 
of the arguments of both sides, as multiple citizenship can be seen as an avatar of 
open borders, in facts their supreme expression. The critique of closed borders is 
based firstly on a liberal egalitarian vision that regards all humans as free and equal 
beings. This claim is shared by postnationalism. The arguments do not refer only to 
territorial borders, but also to membership borders. In this respect, the advocates of 
open borders consider citizenship as ”the modern equivalent of feudal privilege” and 
as ”an inherited status that greatly enhances one’s life chances” making ”restrictive 
1 Ibidem, p. 3.
2 Christian JOPPKE, ”Citizenship between...cit.”, p. 12.
3 Ibidem, p. 20.
4 Ibidem.
5 Arash ABIZADEH, ”Democratic Theory…cit.”, pp. 37-65.
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citizenship”1 (a pleonasm in fact) hard to justify. Thus, by restricting the freedom of 
movement and of every being to improve its life conditions, closed borders enforce 
social inequalities. As control of immigration is a first step in restricting the access to 
citizenship, closed borders are seen as a violation of the liberal egalitarian principles. 
The arguments of liberal egalitarians are sometimes contradictory, as the same author 
states in a piece of work that 
”the initial allocation of citizenship on the basis of birthplace, parentage or 
some other combinations thereof is not objectionable from the liberal egalitarian 
perspective”, and in another that ”individuals should be free to change their 
membership at will” 2. 
Not even the liberal egalitarians can justify multiple citizenship, as it does not 
constitutes a change per se of membership, but the accumulation of citizenships, hence 
of birth privileges. Thus, on the same line of liberal-egalitarian arguments, we could 
say that multiple citizenship is even more discriminatory than simple national 
citizenship, as it enforces inequality between the individuals. However, under non-
ideal circumstances the advocates of open borders admit that the survival of liberal 
egalitarian institutions requires a control of borders. Such arguments can be found in 
the work of Joseph Carens or Philip Cole3. According to Cole, liberal theory cannot 
justify membership without suffering major transformations, as in the form of liberal 
nationalism, and liberal egalitarians cannot find a justification to closed borders, if 
they sincerely believe that the moral equality of humanity is the core of liberal 
democracy4. There are also more radical voices who argue that even in non-ideal 
circumstances, liberal egalitarianism demands for open borders5. In what concerns 
the arguments for closed borders, they vary from apocalyptic visions of waves of 
immigrants breaking the public order, and leading to the collapse of the immigration 
countries’ economies, to arguments that can very well find support in present-day 
realities. One such argument is that the political values of the immigrants may be 
contradictory to that of the immigration states, endangering thus social integration 
and cohesion6. Moreover, liberal democracy requires a certain degree of homogeneity 
that can be assured only through closed borders. This argument touches the delicate 
issue of the clash of civilizations and it is even more powerful in the case of dual 
citizens, as their presence can threaten the particularity of the nation, and of the State, 
in terms of political culture, as we have seen in the case of the burqa. The argument of 
the homogeneity, and its link to democracy, can be found also in the work of Carl 
Schmitt, as we will see. Closed borders and restrictive membership are means of 
1 Joseph CARENS, ”Aliens and Citizens...cit.”, p. 229.
2 IDEM, ”Migration and Morality: A Liberal Egalitarian Perspective”, Brian BARRY, Robert 
GOODIN, Free Movement: Ethical Issues in the Transnational Migration of People and of Money, 
Pennsylvania State University Press, University Park PA, 1992, p. 27.
3 See Phillip COLE, Philosophies of Exclusion...cit. 
4 Ibidem, pp. 202-203.
5 See Arash ABIZADEH, ”Liberal Egalitarian Arguments for Closed Borders: Some 
Preliminary Critical Reflections”, Éthique et économique, vol. 4, no. 1, 2006, http://ethique-eco-
no mique.org (last consulted on 25.05.2010).
6 Will KYMLICKA, ”Territorial Boundaries...cit.”, pp. 249-275.
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protecting the political culture of a community and its ”democratic autonomy”1. 
Immigrants who may be profoundly anti-liberal in their conceptions, can have also 
disloyal political intentions, threatening thus not only the liberal democratic 
institutions, but also the security of the other members. The dilemma here is the 
”toleration of the intolerant in liberal regimes”2. This argument concerns, in the case 
of dual citizens that could be endowed with non-liberal conceptions, their capacity to 
vote in more than one country, that is problematic to democratic theory, as they 
participate in the expression of more than one national sovereignty. In this case, 
sovereignty is no longer national, since the voting rights of dual citizens can be seen 
as a foreign intrusion, as a violation of the national sovereignty. Another issue concerns 
the securitization of citizenship that we also discussed in this paper. Dual citizens can 
be seen as foreign agents, vehicles of anti-liberal values, which may threaten liberal 
democracy not only by their political and civil rights (voting and petitioning, but also 
forms of protest) and by every-day behaviour, but also by terrorist activity, crime3 etc. 
Finally, open borders are seen as compromising the capacity of the welfare systems 
completely or in part, as many immigrants remain unemployed, and are assisted by 
the state. Thus, Robert Goodin argues that ”a particularly generous welfare state will 
always be at risk of being swamped with immigrants, so long as it allows people to 
move in freely from abroad”4, although open borders should be justified as a matter 
of principle. In the case of immigrants, the question is: should the immigrant states 
have financial responsibilities towards aliens, supporting them economically, rather 
than distributing the money collected from taxes to its own citizens? The postnationalists 
criticize the normative strain behind the argument holding that the responsibility 
towards the domestic poor overrides the one towards the global poor, since it violates 
the principle of human equality5. The question here is one of ethics, and not so much 
of politics. If ”special responsibilities are justified insofar as some non-instrumentally 
valued relationships are vital constituents of a life with moral agency”6, Abizadeh 
asks, then are relations of citizenship necessary for the moral agency and are they 
vital elements of well-being? Against the theory of the nation-state and liberal 
democracy, Abizadeh claims that citizenship and closed borders do not ensure well-
being, and their ”putative non-instrumental value is inexistent” since they foster 
relations of inequality at the level of the world society7. The use of coercion against 
outsiders, for the benefit of the citizens, cannot thus be justified without the rejection 
of the liberal-egalitarian principles. However, does moral equality between individuals 
entail that they should be treated the same by the state? Defenders of closed borders 
stress the fact that the national borders have a moral relevance as well, because 
relations of citizenship create intense relations of shared lives that give rise to certain 
1 Joseph CARENS, ”Migration and Morality...cit.”, pp. 40-41.
2 Ibidem, p. 28.
3 See Ricky van ŒRS, Betty de HART, Kees GROENENDIJK, ”The Netherlands”, cit., 
pp. 408-409.
4 Robert GOODIN, ”If People Were Money”, in Brian BARRY, Robert GOODIN, Free 
Movement: Ethical Issues in the Transnational Migration of People and Money, Pennsylvania State 
University Press, University Park, PA, 1992, p. 11.
5 Arash ABIZADEH, ”Liberal Egalitarian...cit.”, p. 5.
6 Ibidem, pp. 6-7.
7 Ibidem, p. 7.
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obligations1. This consideration is convergent with the definition of the nation as a 
community of destiny. It is also clear that, in the case of dual nationals, they cannot 
have two or more shared lives and cannot maintain close relations of citizenship with 
more than one political community. Another strong argument against dual citizenship 
and open borders is that reciprocity can exist only within some national borders, and 
that justice is relevant only under conditions of reciprocity2. If reciprocity is undermined 
by multiple allegiance, then multiple citizens should not take part in relations of 
justice. The relation between reciprocity and justice can be found in the work of 
Aristotle. In Aristotelian thinking, reciprocity is regarded in the context of economic 
trade, as a form of justice, correcting the social imbalance, and maintaining the 
community3. It acts like a social glue, and has also an important political function. For 
Aristotle, it is precisely reciprocity that holds the political community together, 
diffusing social harmony between classes. What is more, the way reciprocity is 
conceived, in terms of exchange, reflects the values of the community in which the 
exchange is taking place4. Therefore, if we consider citizenship as the relationship 
containing an exchange between State and citizens (in terms of rights and duties), the 
rules that manage this exchange, that is, the laws and policies on the grant and loss of 
citizenship, can tell us more about the way a state defines the collective identity of its 
citizens, and the community itself, as represented by the nation. If the legislation 
permits multiple citizenship, we could say, in order to use Aristotelian terms, that the 
State has a better exchange ratio than other states, and conceives reciprocity in a 
particular way, that is more advantageous for the citizens. Robert Dahl also states that 
”any deviation from maximum reciprocity means political inequality”5. The nation is, 
in this sense, a community of reciprocity and a moral community as well, people 
sharing a common life having stronger duties towards each other6. Dual nationals are 
suspected of undermining the principle of reciprocity, because they can redraw any 
time from the decisions taken in the political community, by relocating in another 
country; thus from a liberal-egalitarian perspective, they are not bound by relations of 
justice, as justice is restricted to the state borders. Some defenders of open borders put 
under question the moral worth of citizenship, as creating bonds of reciprocity and 
responsibility. In their view, citizenship should not have a superior moral worth to the 
condition of human being7. In this sense, this liberal-egalitarian view is profoundly 
anti-statist and anti-national, and entails a demotion of national citizenship. In 
attacking the special moral worth of citizenship, the liberal-egalitarians, that share 
some views with the postnationalists , attack also the exclusivity of citizenship (in the 
sense that it consecrates exclusive communities which maintain relations of reciprocity 
only within the community, not having relations and responsibilities towards 
1 John ISBISTER,”A Liberal Argument for Border Controls: Reply to Carens”, International 
Migration Review, vol. 34, no. 2, Summer 2000, p. 630.
2 Ibidem, p.632.
3 Gabriel DANZIG, ”The Political Character of Aristotelian Reciprocity”, Classical Philology, 
vol. 95, no. 4, October 2000, p. 401.
4 Ibidem, p. 423.
5 Robert DAHL, Charles LINDBLOM, Politics, Economics and Welfare, University of Chicago 
Press, Chicago, 1953, p. 123.
6 Michael WALZER, Spheres of Justice, cit., p. 33.
7 Joseph CARENS, ”Open Borders and Liberal Limits: A Response to Isbister”, International 
Migration Review, vol. 34, no. 2, Summer 2000, p. 641.
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outsiders). Although the liberal egalitarians claim that there is no empirical proof of 
the special bonds between citizens1, they forget the fact that all states are aim to be at 
least minimal welfare states, in the sense that they adopt redistributive policies. The 
infrastructural capacity of the states, as it was defined by Michael Mann2, was 
developed in the state-building process on the assumption of the special relationship 
between the citizens. Despite the critique of closed borders, there are systematic moral 
justifications for closed borders that emphasize precisely the moral and political 
worth of citizenship. Thus, for Michael Walzer distributive justice, that is proper to 
the modern state and democracy can exist only in a political community of membership, 
in which people share a common culture. Justice in itself is the product of ”historical 
and cultural particularism”3, while the idea of justice ”presupposes a bounded world 
in which distribution takes place”4. The first good that is distributed is membership, 
that is citizenship, which has an ontological dimension. As Carens underlines, our life 
chances and choices are made in special settings, determined by national citizenship. 
In this sense, citizenship has a big effect on people’s life, even if this deterministic 
dimension of citizenship is often underscored. Citizenship underscores thus the moral 
dimension of the nation as political community. Another value that lies at the core of 
citizenship and democracy is trust. Membership to the national community that is 
expressed by citizenship provides access to the ”circle of trust” between State and its 
citizens, and between the citizens themselves. One reason why double nationality 
was forbidden is precisely this lack of trust with regard to the double nationals. It was 
doubtful that they could be trustworthy. If trust was regarded mostly in terms of 
military duties, nowadays we cannot say that trust lost all importance in modern 
democracies. As we have seen, terrorism as epiphenomenon of globalization, brought 
a securitization of citizenship, and also a debate on whom we, the people, can trust. 
Nations can be conceived as trust networks, that is, 
”ramified interpersonal connections, consisting mainly of strong ties, within 
which people set valued, consequential, long-term resources and enterprises at 
risk to the malfeasance, mistakes or failures of others”5. 
As Charles Tilly points out, democracy requires greater trust than other political 
regimes6. Piotr Sztompka also emphasized the salience of trust cultures for political 
order and for democracy7. Democratization and the nation-building processes are 
used to create trust among the members of the political community, by equalising 
and homogenising the population, in terms of access to rights and freedoms, but at 
the same time differentiating it from other communities. Trust is also a key element 
in the relation between state and nation, as David Miller observes8. States rely on 
1 Ibidem.
2 See Michael MANN, The Sources of Social Power, vol. II, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, New York, 1993, pp. 59-61.
3 Michael WALZER, Spheres of Justice, cit., p. 6.
4 Ibidem, p. 31.
5 Charles TILLY, Democracy, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2007, p. 81.
6 Ibidem, p. 93.
7 Piotr SZTOMPKA, Trust. A Sociological Theory, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
2003, p. 139.
8 David MILLER, ”The Nation-State…cit.”, p. 137.
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the voluntary cooperation of their citizens in order to adopt and implement policies. 
Thus, the state machinery cannot function without mutual trust that stems from a 
shared identity. Now, dual nationality is not at ease with the moral dimension of the 
nation, and with the trust culture of the democratic states, which are not universal. On 
the contrary, they function only as long as membership is an exclusive category.
In the case of dual citizens, the question is, whose state is the responsibility to assist 
the dual citizens, as they contribute to only one welfare system, but they hold rights 
in more than one country? Despite the fact that multiple citizenship is considered to 
be an expression of open borders and a fulfilment of liberal-egalitarian principles, 
paradoxically it creates inequality between the members of a political community, as 
most of them hold only one citizenship. One cannot reject the fact that multiple citizens 
have more right than those who hold only one citizenship. Moreover, their duties 
are often reduced through bilateral treaties and other agreements of this sort. These 
situations can be rightfully seen as undermining the cohesion and solidarity of the 
nations, and the functioning of welfare systems; as boundary ethics literature points 
out, the debate is also ethical, not only political. In order to avoid such tormenting 
questions, some states, consolidated democracies, took legislative measures in 
restricting the access to citizenship. Such is the case of the Netherlands and of Denmark, 
two European countries that have some of the most restrictive citizenship laws in 
Europe. Both countries have taken measures in order to avoid situations of multiple 
citizenship. Thus, besides renunciation of former citizenship upon naturalization, a 
stipulation of the Dutch Nationality Act, in 1985 the Netherlands decided also that 
Dutch nationality was to be lost automatically after ten years of residence abroad. 
Although between 1991 and 1996 dual citizenship was permitted, in 1997 it was again 
forbidden. Denmark condemns multiple citizenship even today, despite the fact that 
all Nordic countries, that traditionally forbade multiple nationality, reformed their 
citizenship laws, as to tolerate it. 
However, one must not forget that states are territorial closures and have an interest 
in continuing being so1. This does not mean that they have an interest in actually 
excluding noncitizens. If it was so, there would be no possibility for naturalization, or 
permanent residence for foreigners. But borders are essential to the modern state, in 
what concerns the ”project of territorial rule”2 and governance in the end. A more subtle 
connection exists between the citizenship and this territorial juridical dimension of 
the states, that is violated by the existence of multiple citizenship. States are bounded 
spaces of authority that bind the members to the political community3. The state has 
responsibilities and duties towards its citizens, as well as the citizens are an object 
of governance. Multiple citizenship creates overlapping spaces of governance and 
membership, as multiple citizens are subject at the same time, to the claims of several 
states. In this respect, the responsibility towards its citizens and the authority of state 
to enforce the law no longer stops at the national borders, but trespasses borders 
and violates the sovereignty of other states. Thus, movements across boundaries and 
migration engage also the vital interests of the states4, not only of the individuals. 
As citizenship was born out of the need to standardize admission and expulsion 
1 Rogers BRUBAKER, Citizenship and Nationhood...cit., p. 24.
2 Ibidem.
3 Ibidem, pp. 24-25.
4 Ibidem, p. 25.
530
Romanian Political Science Review • vol. X • no. 3 • 2010
ANA-MARIA TANAŞOCA
practices, and to establish as a rule that each individual should belong to one, and 
only one state1, multiple citizenship can be seen as a political non-sense.
A strong argument for closed borders and for single citizenship is the democratic 
one: democracy requires boundaries in order for a political community to exercise the 
right of self-determination. Thus, another problematic issue arises, as the dissolution 
of boundaries (territorial and membership boundaries) and multiple citizenship are 
at odds with the doctrine of national sovereignty, that lies at the core of democracy 
itself. According to Brubaker, ”citizenship remains a bastion of national sovereignty”2. 
For how long, we might ask, considering the recent developments? The power of 
closure of the state stems from the sovereignty of the nation, and it is essential to the 
political communities. The emergence of national citizenship went hand in hand with 
the creation of unitary internal sovereignty3, the nation-state replacing the numerous 
jurisdictions that coexisted, and national citizenship replacing urban citizenship and 
other types of collective identities. Thus, we could say that every state has the legal 
and moral right to exclude aliens, on the basis of the doctrine of the sovereignty of the 
nation. This link between exclusion and the right of the nations to self-determination 
is emphasized by Carl Schmitt and Michael Walzer.
Multiple citizenship underlines also another tension, that between liberalism and 
democracy. For some liberal egalitarians and postnationalists, liberalism requires that 
”the exercise of political power be in principle justifiable to everyone, including 
the persons over whom it is exercised, in a manner consistent with viewing each 
person as free (autonomous) and equal”4. 
One could say that citizenship makes possible this claim, especially as it is a birth 
privilege. For the same postnationalists nevertheless, this principle is incongruous 
with the principle of popular sovereignty, according to which 
”the exercise of political power is legitimate only insofar as it is actually justified 
by and to the very people over whom it is exercised”5. 
The problem from the point of view of the postnationalists is that democracy 
presupposes a demos, a particular political community, that is by its nature bounded 
and operating with categories of inclusion/exclusion. Democracy requires a 
nation, a people, and nations cannot be but exclusive, bounded, particular political 
communities. However, liberalism requires the abolition of the nation-state and 
of all other boundaries6. If we take into account that democracy is a form of 
government, and that from the postnationalist point of view democracy should 
collapse in favour of unlimited liberalism a problem remains: that of government. The 
postnationalist stance in therefore anarchical, since it does not take into account the 
need for governmentality, in Foucauldian terms. Moreover, the dissociation between 
liberalism and democracy is problematic as the two concepts maintain symbiotic 
1 Ibidem, p. 27.
2 Rogers BRUBAKER, Citizenship and Nationhood...cit., p. 3.
3 Ibidem, p. 53.
4 Arash ABIZADEH, ”Democratic Theory...cit.”.
5 Ibidem.
6 Ibidem.
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relations, embodied by the expression of liberal democracy. Self-determination 
is an expression of liberalism and of the freedom of association. In Walzer’s view, 
borders, whereas territorial or membership borders, represent ”the deepest meaning 
of self-determination”1. Still, some postnationalist writers, like Frederick Whelan and 
Arash Abizadeh, advance claims of an unbounded demos that is compatible with the 
theory of popular sovereignty, in an attempt to solve what they consider to be the 
conflict between liberalism and democracy. Their main assumption is that the demos 
is not inherently bounded, and that the democratic theory is incapable of drawing 
the boundaries of the demos2. According to Abizadeh, the boundedness of the demos 
renders the theory of the popular sovereignty incoherent as: 1. the boundaries of the 
demos are not established by the will of the people; 2. the exercise of power cannot 
be justified to those over whom power is exercised, because some are excluded 
from membership3. Hence, borders are seen as illegitimate from a democratic 
perspective. It is clear here that the postnationalist writers reject the use of nationality 
as a legitimate principle in the constitution of the demos, and as a principle that is 
compatible with democracy and liberalism. The people, although it is not defined by 
democratic theory, it is not a vague, amorphous mass of individuals atomized and 
alienated. As there were differences between the national communities even before 
the emergence of a national consciousness, we cannot say that difference between the 
world communities was created from scratch, artificially. It was part of the evolution 
of mankind. In modern times, the principle of definition of the people became the 
nation, as a community with shared existence, shared history and interests. Another 
reason why the demos must be bounded stems from the need of homogeneity as a 
sine qua non condition for democracy, like Carl Schmitt notices4. Despite this author’s 
political preferences that retrospectively seem at odds with democracy, homogeneity 
has to be understood here as resulting from a conception of equality that exists at the 
core of democracy itself – ”substantive equality”5. Of course, this equality has been 
embodied by the concept of citizenship that emerged during the French Revolution 
precisely as a means to fight privileges and to level the demos. Citizenship was not a 
simple legal status, it was based on the assumption of similarity of the members of 
one political community. Thus, certain categories have been deprived of citizenship 
on the basis of their difference. Legitimating discourses with a glow of science have 
been created in order to exclude from the community of citizens, women, blacks 
and other categories. For the aliens this principle is still in practice. Schmitt criticizes 
the type of equality put forward by postnationalists and liberal egalitarians, that of 
human equality. He rightly observes that: 
”The equality of all persons as persons is not democracy, but a certain kind 
of liberalism, not a state form, but an individualistic-humanitarian ethic and 
Weltanschauung. Modern mass democracy rests on the confused combination of 
both”6. 
1 Michael WALZER, Spheres of Justice, cit., p. 62.
2 Arash ABIZADEH, ”Democratic Theory...cit.”.
3 Ibidem.
4 Chantal MOUFFE, The Paradox…cit., p. 38.
5 Ibidem.
6 Carl SCHIMITT, The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1985, p. 9, 
quoted in Chantal MOUFFE, The Paradox…cit., p. 39.
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Schmitt points out here to the confusion between liberalism and democracy, that 
we could observe in the arguments of Abizadeh and of other liberal egalitarians. Their 
conception of citizenship and of multiple citizenship stems from this humanitarian 
ethic that denies all political dimension to citizenship and to democracy. The need for 
boundaries is legitimate from a political point of view. but in most cases, as we have 
seen, fails to be so from an ethical perspective. The postnationalist stance is in this sense 
not only anti-statist and anti-national, but also anti-political. Despite the opposition 
conceived by Schmitt between liberalism and democracy, it goes without saying that 
democracy bears an important normative dimension and that the demos is a moral 
community as well. Equality can exist only in relationship with inequality, and it is not 
general all absolute. Thus, because the equality posed by democracy is a political one, 
it entails that it rests on a principle of distinction. It follows that democracy cannot be 
based on the generality of all mankind, but belongs to specific communities1. In what 
concerns multiple citizenship, it goes against the homogeneity conceived as equality 
of the demos. Multiple citizenship, on the other hand, seems more convergent with 
unlimited liberalism than with democracy and popular sovereignty. It is, as well as 
the ideal of cosmopolitan citizenship, a vehicle of generality, contrary to the national 
homogeneity that emerged as a principle of democracy with the French Revolution. 
It is clear that for citizenship to act as a vehicle of equality and homogeneity, it must 
be an exclusive category and not a collectable item, as multiple citizenship is. Schmitt 
emphasizes that universal equality of individuals, as conceived by cosmopolitan or 
multiple citizenship, represents the complete depreciation of political equality and 
of politics itself2. Another reason for the need of homogeneity in a democracy is that 
of identity between rulers and the people, on which rests the doctrine of popular 
sovereignty. Because in the case of multiple nationality the definition of the people 
does no longer imply a moment of closure, equality and identity of rulers and ruled is 
no longer achieved. What is more, Schmitt points out that, in the absence of politics, 
another sphere of substantial inequalities would prevail: that of the economics3. The 
same argument can be found in Michael Walzer’s work, drawing on Henry Sidgwick, 
who argued that the dissolution of states would leave a “world of deracinated men 
and women”4, a world of the political economists. 
Concerning the dissolution of membership boundaries, the dual nature of multiple 
citizens that are at the same time the insider and the outsider, a sort of Doctor Jekyll 
and Mister Hyde, the familiar and the unfamiliar, makes the relationship between 
citizenship and national sovereignty difficult. The tension emerges from the very 
nature of the nation as a political community born out of a social contract. Despite 
its contractual dimension, the political community is more than a simple community 
of interest. It is a community of destiny that assures the stability of the political 
institutions in time. This particular nature of the national community has been best 
captured by Edmund Burke:
”It is a partnership in all science; a partnership in all art; a partnership in 
every virtue, and in all perfection. As the ends of such a partnership cannot be 
1 Ibidem, p. 40.
2 Chantal MOUFFE, The Paradox…cit., p. 41.
3 Ibidem, p. 42.
4 Michael WALZER, Spheres of Justice, cit., p. 39.
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obtained in many generations, it becomes a partnership not only between those 
who are living, but between those who are living, those who are dead, and those 
who are to be born. Each contract of each particular state is but a clause in the 
great primaeval contract of eternal society, linking the lower with the higher 
natures, connecting the visible and invisible world, according to a fixed compact 
sanctioned by the inviolable oath which holds all physical and all moral natures, 
each in their appointed place. This law is not subject to the will of those, who by 
an obligation above them, and infinitely superior, are bound to submit their will 
to that law”1. 
Multiple citizenship affects the national sovereignty of the demos, and therefore 
the practice of democracy itself, because multiple citizens retain political rights, 
but they are not anymore subjects of law in their birth country. In this sense, they 
disrupt the equality that lies at the centre of democracy. Moreover, is sovereignty 
”national” as long as citizens of other states participate in its expression? It is clear 
that the dual citizens are no longer part of the community of destiny that is their birth 
nation. The definition of the nation as community of destiny is very well illustrated 
by the existence of the pension system, and of the taxing system, that rely precisely on 
the intergenerational solidarity of the nation and on what Walzer calls the communal 
provision2. Both systems are undermined by multiple citizenship, as by bilateral 
treaties the dual citizens are given the chance to contribute to the welfare system 
of only one country. These double taxation agreements between countries are seen 
as increasing equity between citizens but in fact they are creating new inequities. 
Multiple citizenship disrupts the communal provision that makes national citizenship 
valuable and saps the legitimation of the nation-states, which makes us ask ourselves 
as Rousseau did: 
”How can they love it, if their country be nothing more to them than to 
strangers, and afford them nothing but what it can refuse nobody?”3. 
Blurring boundaries and the distinction between national and foreigner, multiple 
citizenship undermines the very foundation of the states. We must observe that 
classical liberal thought did not consider nationality incompatible with liberalism. 
In the sixteenth chapter of Representative Government, John Stuart Mill argues that 
nationality leads to free government. For Mill, the main ingredient of nationality 
is the ”identity of historical antecedents”4. The main argument for this, is that civil 
society could not oppose the state, if it was not culturally united, fact that helps 
create the ”fellow-feeling”5 necessary for government. In the context in which 
1 Edmund BURKE, The Evils of the Revolution, selection from Reflections on the Revolution in 
France (1790), Penguin, London, 2008, p. 51.
2 Michael WALZER, Spheres of Justice, cit., p. 64.
3 Jean-Jacques ROUSSEAU, ”A Discourse on Political Economy”, in The Social Contract and 
Discourses (1761), translated by G.D.H. Cole, J.M. Dent and Sons, London and Toronto, 1923, 
E-book The Online Library of Liberty, http://files.libertyfund.org/files/638/Rousseau_0132_
EBk_v5.pdf, p. 217 (last consulted on 27.05.2010).
4 John Stuart MILL, Considerations on Representative Government, Harper and Brothers 
Publishers, New York, 1862, p. 308.
5 Ibidem, p. 310.
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national citizenship is devaluated by the rise of European citizenship and by plural 
citizenship, we can ask ourselves if democracy can function without a proper demos, 
without a fellow-feeling. The problem of postnationalism is that it delegitimizes the 
people, the nation, the demos, that is, bounded communities, promoting under the 
umbrella of human rights pure human generality. Pierre Manent asks himself what 
future would such an association based on human generality have1. In fact Manent’s 
arguments for the nation-state as a basis of democracy are a wonderful critique of the 
postnationalist school. Thus, postnationalism conceiving democracy as a feeling ”of 
the human resemblance that turns against the last difference”2 is profoundly against 
the sovereign nation-state. Manent observes that in present days the state is less 
sovereign, and the government is less representative3. These developments are due 
also to the rise of multiple nationality that erodes the national sovereignty of the state 
and the descriptive representativeness of the political institutions. Paradoxically, the 
endorsement of democratic values goes hand in hand with a weakening of government4, 
as the democratic values are embraced in the framework of an universalistic ethic of 
humankind. 
Conclusion
The study of multiple citizenship remains a marginal study in the field of research 
of nationalism and citizenship. Despite the fact that all the authors emphasize the 
proliferation of multiple citizenship in the last 20 years and predict that it will spread 
further on, there is little empirical data to be used. In this paper we have tried to study 
multiple citizenship in relation to political theory and to emphasize its conflicting 
aspects at the theoretical level. However, we are aware of the fact that empirically, it is 
hard to demonstrate the negative effects that multiple citizenship has on democracy 
and on the nation-state, because theoretical concepts are quantified with difficulty, 
because of their complexity. We have strived, nevertheless, to bring some empirical 
evidence on this matter. We accept the fact that multiple citizenship does not have a 
full effect as, often, individuals are not aware of the fact that they hold more than one 
citizenship, and that states do not have always a clear evidence of it, especially that 
a strict evidence and control would require the close cooperation of the states and 
the centralization of the citizenship data. Thus, the effect could be smaller than the 
one predicted by the number of multiple citizens. However, the combination of jus 
sanguinis with the jus soli principle that is present in the majority of citizenship laws 
can lead to a proliferation of multiple citizenship, and to an increase of the number 
of citizenships that one individual holds, from one generation to another, through 
migration and mixed marriages. This could make us believe that at a certain point, 
individuals will have only one active citizenship, while maintaining the other(s) 
passive. Still we argue that from a rational choice perspective, the multiple citizens 
will take advantage as well as they can, this meaning that they will try to free-ride 
as much as possible, when it come to duties towards the states. Indisputably, this 
1 Pierre MANENT, Raţiunea naţiunilor, cit., p. 17.
2 Ibidem, p. 31.
3 Ibidem, p. 54.
4 Ibidem, p. 66.
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entails inequality between the citizens of a political community. Making citizenship 
readily available means in fact to ”de-essentialize” citizenship, as a fundamental basis 
for democracy. Over the centuries, equal citizenship was born of revolutions, as the 
French Revolution, of cycles of protest (first and second wave of feminism), out of 
war, individuals paying with their blood for equal membership. Equal citizenship 
was every time established as a means to fight privileges. Unfortunately, multiple 
citizenship contradicts this logic. It creates new privileges, because citizenship as 
a means of fighting privileges, was necessarily conceived as unique and exclusive 
membership, in order to assure equality, as we have shown in this paper.
We also have to bring some clarifications in what concerns the critique of open 
borders, which we used in this paper to combat multiple nationality. This paper is not, 
by no means, a condemnation of emigration. Every individual should be free to build 
a life in another state than his birthplace. National birth citizenship is in this respect 
the biggest source of inequality between individuals. It links individuals to different 
political systems that provide unequal chances in social and political terms. However, 
emigration is mostly born of dissatisfaction with the rights and chances offered by the 
fatherland. This means that the state who is left by its citizens, should remain out of 
citizens, upon their naturalization in another state. 
In a nutshell, the issue of multiple citizenship must be regarded from a plurality 
of perspectives, which include the theoretical and the normative ones. Until present 
day, the few studies on this subject focused mainly on the legal dimension. This 
is not to say that such studies are not important. These studies provide important 
material for further research. They are important also because they emphasize what 
has become already a trend in national legislations: the wider acceptance of dual 
citizenship. Though this development is presented by the postnationalist literature as 
improving democracy, we can wonder if this is really the case. Because our attempts 
of theorization of this, once anomalous, type of membership show rather a perverse 
effect when considered in relation to the state, the nation and democracy.
